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COMMENT

Paranoia, Patriotism, and the Citizen Militia
Movement: Constitutional Right or Criminal
Conduct?

I.

INTRODUCTION

As this country rushes towards the twenty first century, a growing
cloud of civil unrest has found its way into the hearts of many Americans. In a bold move to challenge the power of the federal government,
a significant number of American citizens have sought refuge from
perceived government injustice by forming citizen militias. These self
styled militia groups fear that the liberties guaranteed by the United
States Constitution are rapidly evaporating in the wake of a federal
government that has grown too large and powerful. For example, while
addressing the Senate Subcommittee on terrorism, Norman Olson
(Commander of the Michigan Regional Militias) characterized the federal
government as the "child of the armed citizen" and stated that "[t]he
increasing amount of federal encroachment into our lives indicates the
need for parental corrective action."' While Olson and other militia
1. Olson Brief of Oral Testimony, at 1, submitted to The Militia Movement in the
United States, 1995, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Terrorism, Technology, and
Government Information of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong., 1st Sess.,
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activists claim as their purpose restoration of the republican form of
government envisioned by the founding fathers, the tragic bombing of
the Murrah Building in Oklahoma City has called their methods into
question.2 Conversely, citizen militia groups have denounced the
bombing and deny any involvement in the event.' In response to the
bombing and other alleged acts of violence, two congressional hearings
have been conducted in an effort to gather information on the citizen
militia movement to determine if they pose a criminal threat to our
society.4 Furthermore, several bills have been proposed to prohibit the
formation of citizen militias.5 Finally, several states have enacted laws
June 15, 1995) (statement of Norman Olson, Interim Commander, Michigan Regional
Militias) [hereinafter Olson Brie/I.
2. Law enforcement agencies and elected officials have called for "increased authority
to engage in covert surveillance of domestic terrorist groups and congressional hearings on
citizen militias have been scheduled." Randy E. Barnett, Forward: Guns, Militias, and
Oklahoma City, 62 TENN. L. REV. 443, 443 (1995).
3. In a joint written statement provided to the Senate Subcommittee, John Trochmann
and Bob Fletcher (Militia of Montana) denounced the bombing and offered their assistance
to "apprehend all persons that may have planned and/or carried out that dastardly deed
at what ever level they may hide." Trochmann Brief of Oral Testimony, at 1, submitted
to The Militia Movement in the United States, 1995, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Terrorism,Technology, and GovernmentInformationof the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
104th Cong., 1st Sess., June 15, 1995 (Joint statement of John Trochmann & Bob Fletcher,
Militia of Montana) [hereinafter Trochmann Brief].
4. The Senate Subcommittee on Terrorism, Technology, and Government Information
conducted hearings on the citizen militia movement on June 15, 1995. The House
Subcommittee on Crime conducted similar hearings on November 2, 1995. The Senate
hearing included testimony from Robert Bryant (Assistant Director National Security
Division of the FBI), James Brown (Deputy Associate Director BATF), Colonel Fred Mills
(Superintendent Missouri Highway Patrol), Richard Romley (Maricopa County District
Attorney, Phoenix, Arizona), John Bohlman (Musselshell County Attorney, Roundup,
Montana), John Trochmann (Militia of Montana), Robert Fletcher (formerly of Militia of
Montana), Ken Adams (Executive Director of the Confederation of Citizen Militias), James
"JJ"Johnson (militia activist), and Norman Olson (Michigan Militia). The House hearing
included testimony from Brent Smith Ph. D. (Professor UAB), John George Ph. D.
(Professor University of Central Oklahoma), Michael Liberman (ADL), Ken Stern
(American Jewish Committee), Brian Levin (Southern Poverty Law Center), Rick Eaton
(Simon Wiesnthal Center), Ted Almay (Superintendent Ohio Bureau Investigation), Patrick
Sullivan (Sheriff Arapaho County Colorado), Nick Murnion (Garfield County Attorney,
Jordan, Montana), Karen Mathews (Recording Clerk, Modesto, Ca.), Greg Nojeim (ACLU),
and David Kopel (Cato Institute).
5. H.R. 1899, 104th Cong. 1st Sess. (1995) (bill to amend Title 18 U.S.C. § 231(a) to
prohibit certain conduct relating to civil disorders); H.R. 1544, 104th Cong. 1st Sess. (1995)
(bill to prohibit the formation of private paramilitary organizations); H.R. 1710, 104th
Cong. 1st Sess. (1995) (Comprehensive Antiterrorism Act of 1995); see also The ADL Anti.
ParamilitaryTrainingStatute;A Response to DomesticTerrorism, The William and Naomi
Gorowitz Institute on Terrorism and Extremism (1995) (model statute for the prohibition
of citizen militia groups) [hereinafter ADL Statute]. The ADL model statute has been
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that regulate or otherwise prohibit the formation of citizen militias,
training associated with militia activities, and the participation in such
training activities.6
At this time an uneasy truce has developed between militia groups
and law enforcement agencies. Militia activists continue to preach their
interpretation of the Constitution while politicians, law enforcement
agencies and various watchdog organizations seek to prohibit the
continued existence of the militia movement. The fact that a significant
number of American citizens have reached the point of arming themselves to defend against a perceived government threat (whether real or
imagined) reflects a current of government suspicion that should not be
summarily dismissed. Professor Glenn Harlan Reynolds eloquently
makes this point:
When large numbers of Americans begin arming themselves against
their own government and are ready to believe even the silliest rumors
about that government's willingness to evade the Constitution, there
is a problem that goes beyond gullibility. This country's political
establishment should think about what it has done to inspire such
distrust-and what it can do to regain the trust and loyalty of many

Americans who no longer grant it either.'

widely adopted by several states and is similar to the bills proposed by Representative
Jerrold Nadler (H.R. 1899 & 1544).
6. ALA. CODE § 31-2-125 (1973); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 26-123 (1991), 5-71-301, 03,
03 (1985); CAL. [PENAL] CODE § 11460 (West 1992); COLO. REv. STAT. § 18-9-120 (Supp.
1995); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53-206b (1994); FLA. STAT. ch. 870.06 (West 1994), ch. 790.29
(West 1992); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 38-2-277 (1955), 16-11-150, 51, 52 (1985, 1987); IDAHO
CODE §§ 46-802 (1931), 18-8101, 02, 03, 04, 05 (1987); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 20, paras.
1805/94a, 94,95 (1993); IOwA CODE § 29A.31 (West 1995); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 48-203 (1994);
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 38.440 (Baldwin 1954); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:117.1 (West 1986);
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. § 342 (West 1987); MD. ANN. CODE art. 65, § 35 (1987); MASS. GEN.
L. ch. 33, §§ 129 (1985), 30,31,32 (1985); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.528a (West 1991);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 624.61 (West 1987); MISS. CODE ANN. § 33-1-31 (1972); Mo. REV. STAT.
§ 574.070 (1983); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 45-8-107 (1991), 08, 09 (1991, 1995); NEV. REV.
STAT. § 2003.080 (1967); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 111:15 (1990); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:39-14
(1988); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 30-20A-1, 2,3,4 (1990); N.Y. [MILITARY] LAW § 240 (McKinney
1990); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 127A-151 (1994), 14-288.20 (1994); N.D. CENT. CODE § 37-01-21
(1975); OKAY. STAT. ANN. 1321.10 (1968); OR. REV. STAT. § 166.660 (1987); PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. Crimes and Offenses, 5515 (1983); R.I. GEN. LAws §§ 30-12-7 (1994), 11-55-1, 2, 3
(1982); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-8-10, 20, 30 (1989); TEX. [EXECUTIVE BRANCH] CODE ANN.
§ 431.010 (1987); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 18.2-433.1, 2,3 (Michie 1987); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 38.40.120 (West 1983); W. VA. CODE § 15-1F-7 (1963); WYO. STAT. § 19-1-106 (1977).
7. Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Up in Arms About a Revolting Movement, CHI. TRIB., Jan.
30, 1995, § 1, at 11; see also Smith Brief of Oral Testimony, submitted to The Nature and
Threatof Violent Anti.Government Groupsin America, 1995, HearingsBefore the Subcomm.
on Crime, House Comm. on the Judiciary,104th Cong., 1st Sess., Nov. 2, 1995 [hereinafter
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Ultimately, resolution of the issues implicated by the citizen militia
movement requires a balancing of First and Second Amendment rights
against governmental interests in public health and safety. This
comment proposes that armed citizen militia groups have the right to
exist based on a two part theory. First, that the Second Amendment
confers (i) an individual right to keep and bear arms, and (ii) a collective
right of the people to form citizen militias in order to protect against
oppressive and tyrannical government practices. Second, that the First
Amendment protects the speech and associational activities of citizen
militias. By combining the respective rights enumerated in the First
and Second Amendments, citizen militia groups arguably have the
constitutional right to associate, and engage in armed activities, so long
as their activities are not otherwise unlawful."
The first portion of this Comment will focus on the organization,
philosophy, purpose, and activities of the various citizen militias. This
background information is necessary to identify the constitutional
arguments in support of the movement's continued existence. The
second portion of this Comment will identify and discuss state and
federal laws prohibiting the formation of citizen militia groups. Pending
federal legislation will also be discussed. The third portion will consist
of a general summary of the conclusions reached regarding the
constitutional implications of laws designed to prohibit the activities of
citizen militia groups.
II.

THE CITIZEN MILITIA MOVEMENT DEFINED

Citizen militia activists consider the formation of citizen armies as the
legitimate exercise of the constitutional right to keep and bear arms. As
a result, citizen militia groups have been created in a number of states.
In order to determine the validity of claims by militia leaders that the

Smith Brief). Dr. Smith is a professor at the University of Alabama, Birmingham.
Professor Smith stated that:
[Tihe probability that violent, anti-government groups will emerge in any given
social setting is directly related to the level of discontent within society.
Consequently, levels of anti-government violence or domestic terrorism can be
used as a rough gauge of the political instability within a social system. There is
some truth to the notion of domestic terrorism as the tip of the iceberg and, as
such, changes in levels of violent, anti-government behavior should be given
careful consideration instead of merely thinking of it as the ravings of a few
deranged madmen.
Id. at 1.
8. In part II of this Comment, infra, I will discuss how the individual and collective
right to keep and bear arms affects operation of the First Amendment to the activities of
the various citizen militia groups.
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formation of citizen armies is constitutionally protected, an overview of
the types of activities typical of the movement is necessary. It is hoped
that by defining the essential structure, philosophy, activities, and
objectives of the movement, the constitutional implications of restricting
or, alternatively, eliminating citizen militia groups will become clearer.

A.

Structure, Organization,and Numbers

To date the militia movement has not established nationwide
uniformity in the sense of a centralized governing body, but efforts to
create a nationwide network are growing. For example, on November
18, 1995, Macon, Georgia was the site of a self proclaimed citizen militia
conference where movement notables such as J. J. Johnson,9 Bob
Fletcher,10 Nancy Lord, 1 and Bob Starr"2 sought to educate the
general public as to the activities and goals of the militia movement and
recruit militia members. This conference illustrates an effort on the part
of militia activists to organize on a national level.
Towards this end an organization known as the National Confederation of Citizen Militias 13 has been created to assist the various local
militia groups in organizing, recruiting, and retaining members. In a
telephone interview with the executive director of the confederation-Mr.
Ken Adams-he stated that the confederation assists persons attempting
to establish a citizen militia in their locality as well as providing current
documents and other paraphernalia to existing militia groups. The

9. While introducing Mr. Johnson, Bob Starr sarcastically referred to him as one of
the so called racist militia members touted by the press. To the surprise of many, the man
walking up to the podium was an African American. Mr. Johnson claims to be the founder
of a "patriot group" known as E Pluribus Unum which is defined as "one out of many" and
"the motto of the United States of America." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 481 (5th ed. 1979).
Johnson also claims to be co-founder of the Tri-States Militia, and spokesperson for the
Ohio Unorganized Militia.
10. Mr. Fletcher informed the crowd that he was formerly associated with the Militia
of Montana but stated that he has since withdrawn from that organization and was setting
up residence in Atlanta, Georgia. He indicated that he was involved in the Iran/Contra
affair and testified before congressional committees investigating the drugs for arms
scandal.
11. Ms. Lord was listed as vice president on the Libertarian ticket during the 1992
presidential election. She is also an attorney residing in the Atlanta, Georgia area.
12. Mr. Starr is a Macon, Georgia resident who holds the position of Major in the 112th
Warrior Battalion of the Militia of Georgia.
13. The NCCM was founded by Ken Adams and has been in existence approximately
two years. The NCCM is closely related to the citizen militia movement but is not a militia
group. The relationship of the NCCM to actual citizen militia groups is analogous to the
NRA's relationship to the various gun rights advocacy groups. Telephone Interview with
Ken Adams, Executive Director,NCCM (Oct. 26, 1995).
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NCCM claims to be a non-denominational, non-political, and non-racial
organization constituting an alliance of patriotic defense groups.14
In response to efforts by militia leaders and support groups to spread
pro militia propaganda, several organizations are attempting to track
militia groups. Perhaps the most zealous of these watchdog organization
is the Kianwatch project."5 In June 1995 the Kianwatch Project
reported that approximately 131 individual militia groups were present
throughout the United States with approximately 23 of those groups
possessing racist ties.'" Brian Levin (Associate Director Klanwatch
Project), during testimony before the House Subcommittee on crime,
stated that almost 272 militia groups are operating in 48 states, with at
least 66 of those groups having ties to the white supremacist movement. 17 Levin informed members of the subcommittee that Klanwatch
shares its information with over 6,000 law enforcement agencies

14.

The NCCM offers a variety of services to include: (i) intelligence analysis by trained

professionals, (ii) communication networking and conferencing, (iii) educational and
training material resources, (iiii) pro militia radio programming, (iiiii) clearing house for
financial support interests, and (iiiiii) a centralized listing of resources and opportunities.
MICHIGAN MILITIA CORPS, INFORMATION MANUAL, at 15 (June 11, 1995) [hereinafter
MICHIGAN MANUAL].

15. Klanwatch operates under the umbrella of the Southern Poverty Law Center
(SPLC), which is based in Montgomery, Alabama. Responding to white supremacist
activity in the late 1970s, the Center established the Klanwatch project to monitor
extremist groups and track hate crimes. Klanwatch Brief of Oral Testimony, at 1,
submitted to The Nature and Threat of Violent Anti-Government Groups in America
Hearings Before the House Subcommittee on Crime of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,
104th Cong., 1st Sess., Nov. 2, 1995 [hereinafter Kianwatch Brie/I (statement of Brian
Levin, Associate Director, Klanwatch Project, SPLC). Morris Dees, founder of the SPLC,
is noted for his staunch opposition to racist organizations. Mr. Dees representation of the
plaintiffs in Vietnamese Fisherman's Ass'n v. Knight Riders of the Ku Klux Klan, 543 F.
Supp. 198 (S.D. Tx. 1982), reflects his commitment to defend against organized and violent
racist activity. In fact, his opposition to such groups resulted in at least one planned
attempt on his life by a now defunct white supremacist group sometimes referred to as the
Order. For a detailed account of the Orders activities and the targeting of Dees for
execution see KEvIN FLYNN & GARY GERHARDT, THE SILENT BROTHERHOOD (Signet Books
1990). Other groups such as the Anti-Defamation League (ADL), the American Jewish
Committee (AJC), and the Weisenthal Center (WC) have become active in scrutinizing the
growth and activities of the citizen militia movement. Most of these watchdog groups are
driven by the fear thatthe militia movement is a breeding ground for hate groups with a
racist agenda.
16. Klanwatch Project Intelligence Report, Citizen Militias & Support Groups In The
United States, Special Militia Task Force Edition, June 1995, at 7, 10 [hereinafter
Klanwatch Report, June 1995].
17. Klanwatch Brief, at 4 (Nov. 2, 1995). It is unclear if Levin's quoted numbers
include militia support groups, and the methodology for arriving at those figures was not
disclosed during the hearing. In any event, the statistics indicate that the movement is
growing rapidly.
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including the FBI and ATF.'8 The substantial increase in militia
activity, if numerically accurate, could be the result of continuing efforts
by militia activists to organize and recruit mainstream Americans to the
movement.
Estimates of the actual number of militia members varies. Norman
Olson estimates that approximately 4.6 million Americans have signed
on to the militia movement.'" Hard and fast figures concerning the
number of militia members nationwide are currently unavailable but
government officials are seeking to obtain more hard data on the size
and strength of the citizen militia movement. For example, Senator
Spectre, Chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on Terrorism, asked
militia leaders to provide his committee (in writing) with information
regarding, "where the militias are, how many there are in each state,
what their names are, what their membership is, what their purposes
are,... [and] what weapons they have."20 Conversely, militia activists
are not inclined to share what they consider to be tactical information
with government agencies or officials. Consider this warning provided to
would be militia members during the November 18, 1995 militia
conference in Macon, Ga.: "Never divulge firepower, specialties of
individuals, or any information that would breach the security of your
unit." Thus, efforts to nail down accurate membership figures are
speculative at best.
The structure of individual militia groups vary to some degree, but are
typically of standard military design. For example, the state of Georgia
is divided into six areas, each area consisting of four sections, and each

18. Id. at 1.
19. Letter from Norman Olson, Interim Commander, Michigan Militia Corps, to R.J.
Larizza, at 2 (Oct. 18, 1995) (on file with author).
20. Transcript of The MilitiaMovement in the United States, 1995, HearingsBefore the
Subcomm. on Terrorism, Technology, and Government Informationofthe Senate Comm. on
the Judiciary, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. 157, June 15, 1995 [hereinafter Senate Transcript,
June 1995]. This request was perceived as an attempt to obtain names of individual
members of the militia movement. Id. at 158. Senator Specter quickly clarified his request
by stating that he was not asking for individual names but rather total numbers. Id. It
is well established that the membership lists of associations are constitutionally protected.
See NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) (order requiring association to produce names
and addresses of all members is substantial restraint on exercise of right to freedom of
association).
21. Letter from Bob Starr, Major, Warrior Battalion, Militia of Georgia, To Whom it
May Concern (undated) (letter on file with author). This letter was contained in a packet
of materials provided to all participants in the November 1995 citizen militia conference
held in Macon, Georgia.
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section divided up by county.2 The Michigan Militia has an elaborate
organizational scheme. First, the state is physically divided into nine
divisions. Each division has a low of seven and a high of thirteen
counties within its jurisdiction. The state commander serves as the
ultimate authority, with a subordinate command structure consisting of
a chief of staff (serving the state commander), divisional officers, and
brigade commanders." At this time it appears that centralization of
the command structure has been confined to individual states. By
limiting its command structure to the state level, autonomy and security
concerns are satisfied.
To further the integrity of individual militia groups, militia leaders
have set up a scheme designed to protect the identities and numbers of
individual members. Members are urged to muster in squad sized
community units of eight to ten individuals. The squad leader must
appoint a liaison officer, other than him or herself, to communicate with
two neighboring squads. The individual members of each squad are not
allowed to contact members of other squads, and information concerning
other squads and their members is also unavailable. In the event of an
attack, the squads would mobilize to defend against the threat and then
dissolve back into their ten person squads-melting into the community
from which they were formed. This, type of organizational scheme has
been referred to as leaderless resistance.2 4 Militia groups see this
organizational scheme as necessary to the security of their organization.

22. As an illustration, the 112 Warrior Battalion of the Georgia Militia denotes the 1st
area, 1st section, 2nd county. Telephone Interview with Bob Starr, Major, Georgia Militia

(January 6, 1996).
23. MICHIGAN MANUAL, supra note 14, at 8-12. This manual was prepared by Norman
Olson in his capacity as interim commander of the Michigan Militia. In response to intense
media scrutiny in the aftermath of the Oklahoma bombing, the Michigan Militia has
created a "public affairs officer" position on the divisional level. The primary function of
the PAO will be to report and answer inquiries concerning activities in a particular division
and coordinate a unified response to such inquiries as they occur. Id. at 8.
24. See Kianwatch Brief, supra note 15, at 2. In his brief, Levin argues that "the
notion of a violent leaderless resistance' has been imported by the extreme antigovernment movement from the white supremacists... [and] calls for small autonomous
bands of terrorists to ... commit random acts of terror against public institutions,
infrastructure targets, and innocent citizens." Id. See also Louis R. Beam, Leaderless
Resistance, The Seditionist (February 1992) (Beam is a notorious white supremacist whose
quarterly journal is widely read and distributed among white supremacist groups). Levin's
statement implies that the leaderless resistance approach is offensive in nature, but militia
activists have advocated its use to avoid detection from government surveillance. See
Olson Letter, supra note 19, at 1-2.
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B. Philosophy and Purpose of the Citizen Militia Movement
Militia members claim to be patriots who are fighting for the
preservation of the United States Constitution. Militia membership is
strictly voluntary and the movement is self supporting. Norman Olson
of the Michigan Militia stresses the voluntary nature of the movement
stating that "one cannot be forced to be a patriot."25 Olson lists the
groups primary objectives as; "to instruct, to inform and to equip [militia
members]," while maintaining a non denominational, non political, and
non racial organization that, by its very existence, may enlighten and
influence the voting preferences of the general public. He refers to the
Michigan militia as a "popular front movement which tries to embrace
the people," and likens it to the French resistance during WWII.2"
Virtually all citizen militia groups I have researched claim as their
fundamental purpose the protection and preservation of the United
Militia members consider the United States
States Constitution."
Constitution, and consequently, the American Republic under attack by
foreign and domestic forces. For example, citizen militia activists claim
that (i) a sinister global alliance has seized control of financial, media,
and law enforcement institutions in a effort institute a New World Order
government,' (ii) American military researchers have developed a
weather control system that can affect weather patterns and create
earthquakes,' and (iii) that subversive elements in American government are engaging in psychological warfare tactics designed to pacify
and ultimately control, the American people.3"

25. Olson Letter, supra note 19, at 1. Olson goes on to state that there can be no
patriotism if the motivation of a patriot is anything other than altruistic ideals. He claims

that the best way to keep the militia pure is to require that everyone fund themselves. Id.
26. Id.
27. MICHIGAN MANUAL, supra note 14, at 12; Manual for the Standardizationof the
Militia at Large, at 2 (undated) [hereinafter StandardManual]. Members of the Michigan

Militia Corps are required to take an oath that states:
I_
, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support the Constitution of the
United States against all enemies, both foreign and domestic; that I will bear true
faith and allegiance to the same; and that I will obey the orders of those appointed
over me, for conscience sake; SO HELP ME GOD.
MICHIGAN MANUAL, supra note 14, at 14.

28. David A. Newby, No More ConspiracyTheory Just Hard,ProvableFacts,THE FREE
AMERICAN, Nov. 1995, at 9.
29. Albert Nanomius, Weather Control-A Figment of our Overworked Imaginationor
the Ultimate Weapons?, THE FREE AMERICAN, Nov. 1995, at 6-8.

30. K.M. Heaton, PsyWar Being Waged Against America, THE FREE AMERICAN, Nov.
1995, at 17.
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In response to what militia members consider ultimate and imminent
threats to the American Republic, militia leaders are preparing for
potential armed conflict with hostile forces bent on removing our
constitutional form of government. Would be militia members are
encouraged to stockpile not only weapons, but food and survival gear in
an effort to prepare for armed conflict with those in the government who
have "betrayed, abused, and ignored their oath of office to protect and
uphold the Constitution of the United States."' Militia activist J.J.
Johnson's ominous statement that "the only thing standing between
some of the current legislation being contemplated and armed conflict is
time"32reflects the serious implications of the citizen militia movement.
C.

Militia Activities
Identifying the types of activities typical to the various citizen militia
organizations depends in large part on who is asked.' Norman Olson
characterizes the Michigan Militia's training activities as "typically
military-the same one would expect at a 'boot camp,'" and he stresses
that the "National Patriot Militia Movement does not employ Mid-East
brand terrorism."'
Olson lists the short term goal of the militia as
defensive preparedness asserting that the movement is purely defensive
in nature. Training members to be competent soldiers equipped with the
best firearms and equipment they can afford-in preparation for
whatever tomorrow may bring--captures Olson's vision of the short term
objectives of the militia movement.3 5 Olson points out that the doctrine
of deadly force is taught to every soldier. He claims that no offensive
military action is planned against the government at this time, but goes
on to state that psychological warfare and propaganda will be utilized.
He considers the use of force against the government to be dictated by
the government itself, and points to the incident at Waco as an example

31. Standard Manual, at 2.
32. The Militia Movement in the United States, 1995, HearingsBefore the Subcomm.
on Terrorism, Technology, and Government Information of the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. 103, June 15, 1995 (statement of J.J. Johnson, Ohio
Unorganized Militia) [hereinafter Senate Militia Transcript].
33. I did not personally observe any actual training activities staged by citizen militia-

members.

Ultimately, I relied on documents, phone interviews, and transcripts of

testimony provided by militia members and other individuals having some knowledge
(personal or otherwise) of militia activities. I suspect that the information obtained
invariably contains some degree of bias. In an effort to be fair and accurate, information
gleaned from all of these sources is included in this Comment.
34. Olson Letter, supra note 19, at 2.

35. Id.
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of the justifiable use of force against the government on the grounds that
the Branch Davidians acted in self defense."6
In an attempt to control individual members and incorporate clearly
defined behavioral guidelines, the Michigan Militia has enumerated a
code of conduct for its members, and has provided a court martial
procedure for those who engage in illegal acts that could taint the
purpose and image of the military organization. 7 Militia members are
expected to carry "military style firearms" when engaging in military
duties, but the use of firearms is somewhat conditioned in the sense that
militia members are authorized to discharge their weapons either in self
defense or when otherwise ordered to do so.3" From the preceding
statement, it must be assumed that leaders of the Michigan Militia
envision situations where the use of deadly force could conceivably be
used absent the justification of self defense. Ultimately, it appears that
use of force could be ordered based on a subjective determination of the
militia hierarchy, and absent a corresponding threat of force and\or
violence against the militia group.
In an effort to prepare for armed confrontation with hostile forces,
citizen militia groups engage in military training maneuvers designed
to simulate battle conditions. For example, in May 1994 members of the
Michigan militia requested and obtained permission from Mary Hessell
(local official of the village of Pellston Michigan), to use the local park
and pavilion. Militia members arrived dressed in fatigues and face
paint, and carrying semi-automatic weapons. Sentries were posted, and
maneuvers conducted, while a children's baseball game was in progress
just a few yards away. Pellston officials objected to the activity and
requested that future use of the park by militia members not include
the presence of weapons. The maneuvers were allegedly staged by
militia leaders as a means to go public.3" In response to the growing
visibility of the movement, public officials and private citizens have
voiced concerns regarding the presence of citizen militia groups.
Senate Subcommittee hearings on the militia movement reveal the
perception some lawmakers have of the nature and activities of the
citizen militia movement. Senator Kohl remarked, while making his

36. Id.
37. MICHIGAN MANUAL, supra note 14, at 13-14.
38. Id. at 13. The manual does not elaborate on what circumstances, other than self

defense, would justify the use of deadly force against government forces. David
Trochmann, a co-founder of the Montana Militia, was interviewed on the Alan Handleman
radio talk show recently (Mar. 31, 1996), and stated that the use of force against the
government would be justified if the government acted illegally.
39. Beth Hawkins, PatriotGames, METROTIMES, Oct. 12-18, 1995, at 12-16.
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opening statement, that "[tihe hatred some members of these groups
harbor for African Americans, foreigners, and government is particularly
disturbing in light of the escalating political violence in our country."0
Senator Kohl's colloquy highlighted militia members participation in
questionable activities to include the arrest of militia activists and the

seizure of weapons, gas masks, and other military hardware. Kohl
discussed the seizure of documents that revealed plans to destroy
bridges, radio stations, and other targets, as well as plans to use a lethal
poison to kill federal employees and law enforcement agents."'
Additionally, Senator Levin's remarks closely tracked those of Kohl.

Throughout his commentary were allegations of militia misconduct to
include; stalking of law enforcement agents, espousal of "paranoid
conspiracy theories" and extreme hate rhetoric, the stockpiling of
firearms and explosives,' 2 paramilitary training, bail skipping, and

death threats against ATF agents. Levin concluded that "[wie don't need
private armies ... to protect us from government" claiming that the
"ballot box" was the proper means to oppose government oppression, and
that our independent judiciary is adequate to address alleged constitutional rights violations.'3 During a House Subcommittee Hearing on
anti-government groups, Representative Jerrold Nadler made the
following comments; "[tihese private armies are the lawless siblings of
40. Senate Militia Transcript,supra note 32, at 5. Compare Kohl's characterization of
the militia movement as racially motivated with the following statements of black militia
activist J.J. Johnson: "I have never witnessed or even heard of anyone being excluded from
the militia based solely on their racial or ethnic ancestry. I have challenged the media to
provide me with even one such incident. None have come forward." J.J. Johnson, A
Heartfelt Invitation to BLACK AMERICANS, MEDIA BYPASS MAGAZINE, Nov. 1995, at 8.
Johnson attacks the press claiming that:
The "angry white male" label has been gratuitously assigned to us by the
mainstream press: the same press that has painted black males as illiterates,
drug addicts and gang members: the same press that has depicted black women
as welfare mothers, prostitutes and junkies: the same press that keeps our focus
on such grave national issues as Rodney King and O.J. Simpson: the same press
that is desperately trying to convince minorities and ethnic groups to fear and
despise the militia.
Id.
41. Senate Militia Transcript,supra note 32, at 5-7. Kohl also accused "some militias"
of engaging in a "gospel of hate" when referring to a Militia of Montana attacks on Hillary
Clinton and "her regiment of... lesbians, sex perverts, child molesters advocates, christian
haters and.., communists." Id at 7. The quoted attack was allegedly contained in the
Militia of Montana's newsletter entitled "Taking Aim."
42. Weapons are an integral part of the citizen militia movement. For example, militia
officials encourage would be members to obtain a variety of weapons to include; M-1
Garands, M-14s, Mini 14s, M-1 carbines, AK-47s, a minimum of 2000 rounds of
ammunition, and various handguns. StandardManual,supra note 27, at 8.
43. Senate Militia Transcript,supra note 32, at 18-24.
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Hamas and every other criminal band that believes they have the right
to bomb, kill and terrorize the public as a means to win the political
debate.""
Critics of anti-government groups are not confined to government
officials. Karen Mathews, Clerk-Recorder for Stanislaus County,
California, provided chilling testimony of threats and violent acts
directed against her from alleged members of a local tax protester
group.4 Her testimony revealed that her refusal to remove a 416,000
IRS lien against a member of their group, and her subsequent refusal to
record so called common law liens 4 against property owned by IRS
agents, resulted in verbal threats on her life, the placement of a
simulated pipe bomb underneath her vehicle, the firing of shots into a
window of her office while occupied by staff members, and finally a
personal beating in the garage of her home by two males. Mrs. Mathews
testified that she was knocked to the floor, slashed with what she
believed to be a knife, repeatedly kicked and punched, and subjected to
the dry firing of a gun placed to her head.47
While citizen militia groups adamantly deny that they engage in
unlawful acts of violence and intimidation, it is likely that some militia
members engage in activities that are offensive to many Americans. The
critical questions are; what constitutional protections may be afforded to
citizen militia groups and what compelling government interests are
implicated in response to the formation of such groups? Certainly, the
advocation of violence to overthrow the government, reinforced by
training activities designed to achieve such a controversial purpose, calls

44. NadlerBriefof Oral Testimony, at 2, submitted to The Nature andThreat of Violent
Anti-Government Groups in America, 1995, HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on Crime, House
Committee on the Judiciary,104th Cong., 1st Sess., Nov. 2, 1995 [hereinafter NadlerBrief].
45. Ms. Mathews testimony did not allege that her attackers were members of an
organized citizen militia.
46. The filing of "common law" liens has become a popular remedy of groups seeking
to fight back against perceived government injustices. Liens have been filed against IRS
agents, judges, and county officials by groups that have in some way been sanctioned by
such agencies or individuals. While the liens are not legally valid, they create title
problems that usually require legal assistance in having them removed, thus causing
inconvenience and expense to those unfortunate enough to be subject to this practice. See
generally Patrick Brief of Oral Testimony, Submitted to The Nature and Threat of Violent
Anti-Government Groups in America, 1995, HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on Crime, House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong., 1st Sess., Nov. 2, 1995 (statement of Sheriff Patrick
J. Sullivan, Jr., Arapahoe County Co.).
47. Mathews Brief of Oral Testimony, at 1-4, submitted to The Nature and Threat of
Violent Anti-Government Groups in America, 1995, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Crime, House Comm. on the Judiciary,104th Cong., 1st Sess., Nov. 2, 1995 (statement of
Karen Mathews, Clerk-Recorder, Stanislaus Co. Ca.).
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for governmental action. Conversely, citizen militia groups should not
be judged solely on the alleged activities of some self proclaimed militia
members. If the movement is designed for the purpose of defending the
Constitution and ensuring the continued existence of our democratic
republic, the movement may seek to preserve democracy-not destroy it.
Ultimately, militias throughout the country have and will continue to
engage in military maneuvers to prepare for the possibility of armed
conflict with either foreign or domestic foes. It is also safe to assume
that any such maneuvers will involve militia members armed with rifles,
handguns, and other military type weapons. Furthermore, militia
groups have and will continue to conduct training programs aimed at
establishing k proficient and competent class of citizen soldier. In many
states all of these activities are classified as criminal conduct punishable
as either felony or misdemeanor offenses.4" And on the federal level at
least two proposed bills would make these activities federal crimes. 4
Thus, if militia activity continues in its present form, a showdown
between the various militia groups and state and federal law enforcement agencies is inevitable.
III.

STATE AND FEDERAL LAW PROHIBITING CITIZEN MILITIAS

Approximately thirty eight states have law(s) on the books that
prohibit or otherwise regulate citizen militias and/or activities associated
with militia groups.5" These laws generally criminalize three types of
activity. First, the association of two or more individuals in a military
capacity, other than military groups authorized by state or federal law,
constitutes criminal conduct."1 The penalty for such associational
activities is usually a fine and/or confinement for not more than one
year. This particular type of prohibition will be referred to as the
associationalban.
Second, persons who train militia members in the use of weapons or
techniques capable of causing injury or death are guilty of a felony that,
in some states, carries a maximum sentence of ten years and/or fines of
up to 50,000 dollars.52 The ban on such training generally requires
that the trainer know, have reason to know, or intend for the training

48. See supra note 6.
49. See supra note 5.
50. See supra note 6. These laws are sometimes titled as anti-paramilitary training
statutes.
51. Approximately thirty-one states currently outlaw activity of this type.
52. See IDAHO CODE § 18-8103; MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-8-109 (1995). This training is
also in violation of federal law and is punishable by up to five years in prison and/or fines.
18 U.S.C. § 231 (Supp. 1995).
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to be unlawfully used in furtherance of a civil disorder. This prohibition
will be referred to as the instructionalban.
Finally, persons assembling for the purpose of participating in training
of this nature with the intent to unlawfully use the acquired knowledge
in furtherance of a civil disorder are subject to substantial criminal
sanctions. This prohibition will be referred to as the ParticipatoryBan.
To date the ParticipatoryBan has not made its way into the federal
statute books, however, that may soon change. Representative Jerrold
Nadler (D N.Y.) has introduced H.R. 1899 3 in an attempt to impose
criminal liability on individuals that participate in training sessions with
the intent to use the training in furtherance of a civil disorder. This
proposed bill was modeled after the Anti-Defamation League's AntiParamilitary Training Statute, but contains certain differences that will
be discussed later in this comment.
A.

The Associational Ban
The Official Code of Georgia contains a provision that is typical of
most state prohibitions on the association of unauthorized military
organizations, and will serve as the basis for a discussion of the
associational ban. The pertinent code section states:
No body of men other than the organized militia, components of the
armed forces of the United States, and bodies of the police and state
constabulary and such other organizations as may be formed under this
chapter shall associate themselves together as a military unit or parade
or demonstrate in public with firearms.'

This code section constitutes a broadly sweeping ban that prohibits
two separate types of activity. First, and most broadly, it proscribes
association as a military organization by groups other than those
expressly exempt via the statute. The association need not include
weapons and is unlawful even if conducted on private land or in the

53. H.R. 1899, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995). The text of the proposed bill, which seeks
to amend 18 U.S.C. § 231, states:
Whoever trains in the use, application, or making of any firearm or explosive or
incendiary device, or technique capable of causing injury or death to persons,
knowing or having reason to know or intending that the same will be unlawfully
employed for use in or in furtherance of a civil disorder which4A) may in any way
or degree obstruct, delay, or adversely affect- (i) commerce or the movement of any
article or commodity in commerce or, (ii) the conduct or performance of any
federally protected function; or, (B) is in violation of chapter 13 of this Title [shall
be fined under this Title or imprisoned not more than five years, or both].
H.R. 1899, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995).
54. GA. CODE ANN. § 38-2-277(a) (1955) (emphasis added).
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homes of individual members. Second, it prohibits parading or
demonstrating in public, with firearms, by unauthorized military units.
It should be noted that the Georgia Statute has not been judicially
construed. Although associationalban legislation is present in most
states, to date the associationalban has been constitutionally analyzed
only once by a federal district court scrutinizing an analogous Texas
Statute.5 5 For the purposes of this comment, the district court's
analysis of the Texas Statute will provide the foundation for discussion
of the broad scope of associationalban legislation.
1. Construction of Caselaw Supportive of the Associational
Ban. In Vietnamese Fisherman's Ass'n v. Knights of the Ku Klux
Klan,5" the court was faced with the request for a permanent injunction
prohibiting the continued existence of the military arm of the Texas Ku
Klux Klan. This private army, known as the Texas Emergency Reserve
("TER"), sought to intimidate and harass Vietnamese fisherman in the
area of Seabrook and Kemah Texas. In addition to engaging in a
panoply of military training and activities,57 the TER participated in
an armed boat ride through a commercial waterway known as Clear
Creek Channel. During the excursion, TER members conspicuously
displayed weapons while occupying prominent positions throughout the
boat. Most notably, an effigy of a Vietnamese fisherman was hung from
a rear deck rigging."
Ultimately, the court issued a permanent
injunction against the TER enjoining them from associating, parading,
or training as a paramilitary organization.5 9 The court considered
several factors in reaching its decision.
First, the district court was required to construe a Texas statute that
states in pertinent part: "a body of persons other than the regularly
organized state military forces ... or the troops of the United States
may not associate as a military company or organization or parade in

55. See infra note 58 and accompanying text.
56. 543 F. Supp. 198 (S.D. Tex. 1982).
57. Video footage was viewed by the court showing Louis Beam (co-defendant)
instructing persons dressed in military garb in the art of various military techniques to

include; psychological warfare, ambush and counterambush, and reconnaissance patrol.
543 F. Supp. at 203. Additional evidence revealed that members of the TER maintained
a variety of weapons such as, riot shotguns, AR15 semi-automatic rifles, and M-1 carbines.
Training activities of the TER were conducted on at least three private parcels of land
owned by co-defendant's or sympathizers. Testimony revealed that the TER had been in
existence for at least six years. Id. at 203-04.
58. Id. at 202-07.
59. Id. at 219. The court also enjoined the TER from engaging in any other activities
that were intended to, or may lead to the use or threatened use of military force in
violation of the plaintiff class. Id.
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public with firearms in a municipality of the state.' ° The court held
that the Texas Statute "prohibit[ed] both: (1) a body of men from
associating themselves together as a military company or organization;
and (2) the parading in public with firearms in any city or town in
Texas."
The court concluded that the use of the disjunctive "or" in
both statutes removed application of the city/town requirement from the
first prong of the associational ban.6 2 The court reasoned that the use
of a disjunctive indicated alternative prohibitions that must be treated
separately absent legislative intent to the contrary.6
Second, the court concluded that the TER's activities were outside the
scope of First and Second amendment protections. Regarding First
Amendment rights, the court stated that the TER's military activities
involved grave interferences with the public peace and only minimal
elements of communication. Consequently, the activities of the TER were
regarded as impermissible conduct-not protected speech. Alternatively,
the court noted that even if the activities of the TER were characterized
as speech they would not be protected. Specifically, the nature of the
threats initiated by the TER were "classic examples" of fighting words
and thus unworthy of constitutional protection. "
Furthermore, the organization's training activities were determined to
be outside the scope of the freedom to associate on the grounds that
such a right is not a defense to conspiracy or breaches of the peace. The
court noted that the TER would be free to associate and express their
particular views so long as they did so without the threat of military
force. However, the court considered the mere existence of an armed
camp militarily threatening in the sense that the TER's military
capabilities could intimidate (by implication) would be opponents even
if the threat of force was never expressly communicated. Ultimately, the
court considered the existence of a private army alone sufficient to
prevent our democratic form of government from functioning freely and
constitutionally. 66

60. Tex. State Military forces and Veterans Code Ann. § 5780(6) (1987). This statute
has been renumbered and is currently codified under Tex. State Military and Veterans
Code Ann. § 431.010 (1990). Compare GA. CODE ANN. § 38-2-277(a) (1955).
61. 543 F. Supp. at 217.
62. Id. at 217 and n.22. The court noted that "the use of the disjunctive 'or' between
the words 'organization' and 'Parade'... demonstrates a legislative intent to proscribe two
separate activities.. . ." Id.
63. 543 F. Supp. at 217 (citing United States v. Moore, 613 F.2d 1029 (D.C. Cir. 1979)).
64. Id. at 208. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942) (fighting
words are utterances that, in and of themselves, inflict injury or incite immediate breaches
of the peace),
65. 543 F. Supp. at 209-10.
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Additionally, the district court rejected the TER's assertion that the
associational ban offended the Second Amendment. The court reasoned
that "[the] Amendment prohibits only such infringement on the bearing
of weapons as would interfere with 'the preservation or efficiency of a
well regulated militia,' organized by the state.' Because the TER was
not an authorized by the state, it was not exempt from the statute's
prohibition. Ultimately, under the district court's construction of the
associational ban, the formation of citizen militias is lawful only if they
are duly authorized by express language in the statute.
The Georgia statute exempts several groups from its associational ban,
but the Militia of Georgia and other citizen militia groups are outside
the scope of the enumerated exceptions. One such exception-the
organized militia-is defined as the army, navy, air force, and state
defense force.67 These forces are comprised of units of the Georgia
National Guard, or in the case of the state defense force, a duly
organized force formed under state or federal constitutional authority.'
Militia groups such as the Regional Georgia Militia do not fit within the
definition of the organized militia because they are not members of the
Army or Air National Guard, the Georgia Naval Militia, or the State
Defense Force.
Alternatively, some citizen militia groups have sought to justify their
formation by claiming membership in the unorganized militia.'9 In
Georgia, the unorganized militia is defined as "all able-bodied male
residents.., between the ages of 17 and 45 who are not serving in any
force of the organized militia . . 70 It is important to note, however,
that the unorganized militia is not expressly exempt from Georgia's
associational ban. Furthermore, challenges to the associational ban, on
the grounds that membership in the unorganized militia constitutes a
"well regulated militia" for purposes of the Second Amendment, have
been unsuccessful. 7 1 As a result, application of the court's holding in

66. Vietnamese Fisherman'sAss'n, 543 F. Supp. at 210 (citing United States v. Miller,
307 U.S. 174, 178 (1939)) (emphasis added)).
67. O.C.G.A. 38-2-277(a), (b). The Georgia Code also exempts components of the United

States armed forces, police and state constabulary, other organizations formed under the
chapter, and students in ROTC programs offered by educational institutions. Id.
68. GA. CODE ANN. §§ 38-2-20, 21, 22, 23 (1995).
69. See United States v. Warin, 530 F.2d 103 (6th Cir. 1976) (enrollment in
unorganized militia does not confer any Second Amendment right).
70. GA. CODE ANN. § 38-2-3(d) (1955).
71. United States v. Oakes, 564 F.2d 384,387 (10th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S.
926 (1978) (technical membership in the Kansas Militia or membership in a nongovernmental organization such as the Posse Comitatus is insufficient to establish membership
in the state militia); United States v. Hale, 978 F.2d 1016, 1019-20 (8th Cir. 1992), cert.
denied, 113 S. Ct. 1614 (1993) (membership in a hypothetical or sedentary militia is
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Vietnamese Fisherman'sAss'n to the analogous Georgia Statute serves
to validate the associational ban's constitutionality under a Second
Amendment analysis. Thus, every time militia members assemble as a
military unit they are in violation of state law and may be prosecuted
accordingly.
2. Constructional Criticisms of the Associational Ban. A
careful analysis of the district court's reading of the Texas Statute
reveals that the second prong of the statutory prohibition is meaningless.
For example, because parading is typically an associational activity, the
mere act of parading, with arms, as a military unit, even if on private
land, would constitute an unlawful association under the first prong of
the statutory prohibition. In this context, the second prong of the
associational ban becomes meaningless i.e. it is essentially merged into
the first prong's general associational prohibition.
Moreover, while the court in Vietnamese Fisherman'sAss'n concluded
that association as an unauthorized military organization is unlawful,
it failed to provide a definition of "military organization." Thus, what
constitutes a "military organization" for purposes of the associational
ban, is not clear. This begs the question as to whether unarmed groups
would constitute an unauthorized military organization for purposes of
associational ban legislation. The court's interpretation of the first prong
of the statutory prohibition does not expressly require that the association be armed to be unlawful.7 2 Thus, on its face, associational ban
legislation prohibits the mere association of any group, armed or
otherwise, that either (i) claims to be military in nature, or (ii) could be
characterized by governmental agencies as a military organization.
For example, persons forming a citizen militia that expressly
prohibited the use of weapons of any type would be in violation of the
first prong of the statutory prohibition. Additionally, if members of a
local church, calling themselves soldiers for Christ, conducted unarmed
activities aimed at the elimination of criminal acts involving drug abuse
and violence in their particular community, such an organization could
conceivably be characterized as a military unit and subject to criminal
sanctions under the first prong of the associational ban.7"
insufficient to establish membership in the state militia); United States v. Warin, 530 F.2d

103 (6th Cir. 1976) (same).
72. The court held that the Texas Statute prohibited a body of men from associating
themselves together as a military company or organization. 543 F. Supp. at 217.
Additionally, neither the Texas nor the Georgia Statutes define "military organization."

73. While this may appear to be a far fetched hypothetical, "military" may be broadly
defined as "[o]f, pertaining to, or associated with soldiers ... or war." THE AMERICAN
HERITAGE DICTIONARY 434 (office ed. 1987). In this context, patrols by church members
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Under the broad reading of associational ban legislation created by the
district court, government officials would be free to fashion a broad
definition of "military organization" to reach the activities of groups that
are subjectively determined to be a threat to the status quo or otherwise
represent an unpopular or unsavory point of view. Furthermore, absent
of a definition of "military organization," the statute fails to provide
adequate notice to potential violators of the types of conduct falling
within its proscriptions. Essentially, the associational ban is "void for
vagueness" in the sense that it "fails to give persons of ordinary
intelligence fair notice that their contemplated conduct is forbidden by
the statute [citations omitted], and because it encourages arbitrary and
erratic arrests and convictions."74 Arguably, such a broad and unconstitutional reading of the associational ban could be avoided if its
prohibitions were narrowly construed to accommodate constitutionally
protected activities.
Additional constitutional concerns are implicated by operation of the
associational ban. Advocates of the citizen militia movement assert that
the Second Amendment grants citizens the right to assemble citizen
armies for lawful and defensive purposes. Among those purposes is the
right to defend against government overreaching. While the United
States Supreme .Court has refused to speak regarding the scope of the
Second Amendment for more than half a century, lower courts have been
more active. Most lower court decisions either (i) deny that the Second
Amendment confers an individual right to keep and bear arms or (ii)
refuse to extend its application to groups such as the citizen militia. 5

calling themselves soldiers for Christ, in a self declared war against community based drug
activity, falls within the broad definition of "military" quoted above. It follows that such
conduct would be within the associational bans reach if government officials choose to
utilize its provisions under such circumstances.
74. Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162 (1972) (citing United States
v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617 (1954); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940); Herndon

v. Lowrey, 301 U.S. 242 (1937)). In Papachristoua city ordinance (section 26-57) stated
in part that habitual loafers or persons able to work but habitually living upon the
earnings of their wives or minor children were guilty of vagrancy and subject to criminal
sanctions. 405 U.S. at 156 n.1. The Court noted that "unemployed pillars of the

community who have married rich wives" would be in violation of the statute. Id. at 163.
The Court also noted that the statute would allow law enforcement officers to arrest
persons on mere suspicion and without probable cause in an attempt to avoid future
criminality. Id.
75. United States v. Oakes, 564 F.2d 384, 387 (10th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S.
926 (1978) (technical membership in the Kansas Militia or membership in a nongovernmental organization such as the Posse Comitatus is insufficient to establish membership
in the state militia); United States v. Hale, 978 F.2d 1016, 1019-20 (8th Cir. 1992), cert.

denied, 113 S. Ct. 1614 (1993) (membership in a hypothetical or sedentary militia is
insufficient to establish membership in the state militia); United States v. Warin, 530 F.2d
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Given the recent prominence of the citizen militia movement, and the
level of civil unrest associated with a general distrust for government in
general, it would be prudent to define the scope of the Second Amendment. The right to private ownership of firearms is arguably something
most Americans take for granted. However, the recent passage of the
assault rifle ban, combined with court decisions denying that an
individual right to keep and bear arms resides within the Second
Amendment, makes groups such as the Michigan Militia question the
motives of government officials. Recent incidents like Waco, Ruby Ridge,
and the Oklahoma City bombing reflect the degree to which both antigovernment sentiment and government overreaching have affected our
society.
The next section of this comment will attempt to define the Second
Amendment as conferring (i) an individual right to bear arms, and (ii)
the collective right of the people to assemble citizen armies. Consequently, the associational ban will be scrutinized for constitutional infirmities
while assuming that a collective and individual right to keep and bear
arms is contained in the Second Amendment.
3. The Standard Model Theory of the Second Amendment and
the Associational Ban. This Comment proposes that the standard
model theorye7 should be the foundation for identifying the scope of
Second Amendment protections. Essentially, the standard model theory
proposes that the Second Amendment embraces an individual right to
keep and bear arms." It is important to note that the standard model
theory's claim that the Second Amendment embraces an individual right
to keep and bear arms has been either expressly or implicitly recognized
by most states that have enacted associational, instructional, and
participatory bans.7" Furthermore, the individual right to keep and
bear arms is recognized by most Americans as an important and
valuable right. The assertion that the Second Amendment confers an
individual right of ownership of firearms has however, raised some

103 (6th Cir. 1976) (same).

76. Glenn Harlan Reynolds, A CriticalGuide To The Second Amendment, 62 TENN. L.
REV. 461 (1995). An indepth recital of the standard model theory is beyond the scope of
this Comment. Professor Reynolds' article provides a comprehensive analysis of the
standard model theory and will be used to define its basic design.
77. Id. at 466.
78. See supra note 6 and accompanying text. Most of these statutes recognize the right
of the citizenry to engage in armed recreational activities such as hunting, or target
shooting, and some states expressly recognize a constitutional right of individuals to keep
and bear arms. See IDAHO CODE § 18-8101 (1931); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-8-107 (1991).
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concerns as to the tendency of such ownership to impact negatively upon
public health and safety.79
For example, medical professionals consider violence as a health crisis
that is facilitated by the private ownership of firearms."0 Some health
professionals have gone so far as to state that guns are "a virus that
must be eradicated"8" and that the private ownership of firearms is an
evil that should be eliminated to reduce violent activity.8 2 But it is
questionable that elimination of private ownership of firearms would
significantly reduce episodes of violence (criminal or otherwise). The
proposition that private ownership of firearms should be outlawed to
deter future acts of violence can be attacked on at least four separate
grounds.
First, the claim that private ownership of firearms results in criminal
acts of violence by law abiding and responsible citizens suffers from a
lack of persuasive evidence." Second, the defensive value of firearms
to potential crime victims has been greatly underestimated." Third,
enforcement of gun control laws is extremely difficult."5 And fourth,
because gun control legislation is difficult to enforce against those most
likely to employ firearms for an unlawful or irresponsible purpose, the
reduction of violence anticipated by enacting firearm bans is marginal
at best."6 Thus, the assertion that private ownership of firearms should
be banned to accommodate the interests of public health and safety is
unpersuasive. Moreover, individual possession and use of firearms
involves a plethora of legitimate and lawful activities such as self
Thus, recognizing a
defense and various recreational activities.

79. Don B. Kates et al., Guns and PublicHealth: Epidemic of Violence or Pandemicof
Propaganda?,62 TENN. L. REV. 513 (1995).
80. Id. at 523.
81. Janice Sommerville, Gun Controlas Immunization,AM. MED. NEws, Jan. 3, 1994,

at 6-7.
82. William Raspberry, Sick People With Guns, WASH. POST, Oct. 19, 1994, at A23
(quoting Director of CDC's National Center for Injury Prevention and Control as desiring

to create the perception that firearms are deadly, dirty, and should be banned).
83. Kates, supra note 79, at 526.
84. Id.
85. Id. (citations omitted). It is important to note that:
The difficulty of enforcement crucially undercuts the violence-reductive potential

of gun laws. Unfortunately, an almost inverse correlation exists between those
who are affected by gun laws, particularly bans, and those whom enforcement
should affect. Those easiest to disarm are the responsible and law abiding citizens

whose guns represent no meaningful social problem. Irresponsible and criminal
owners, whose gun possession creates or exacerbates so many social ills, are the
ones most difficult to disarm.
Id. at 527.
86. Kates, supra note 79, at 527-28.
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fundamental right to private ownership of firearms serves valuable
social and cultural functions considered by some to be an important part
of our history and heritage.
Without doubt, adoption of the standard model theory would drastically change the way in which courts have thus far construed the Second
Amendment. But Second Amendment jurisprudence has strayed far and
away from the most recent Supreme Court case to consider the scope of
Second Amendment protections.5 7 Assuming that the Second Amendment embraces an individual right to bear arms, the question then
becomes: Does the Amendment have as its underlying purpose the intent
to provide the people with a constitutional right to form citizen armies
to protect against potential government oppression?"
Militia leaders claim that their purpose is rooted in the belief that the
citizenry has the unalienable right to form citizen militias to check
government oppression and ultimately keep control of the government

87. I refer to United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939).
88. To answer this question it is prudent if not essential that the Supreme Court
provide a comprehensive opinion regarding (i) what is a militia?, (ii) what does it mean to
be well regulated?, (iii) what is the right of the people?, (iiii) what does it mean to "keep
and bear arms"?, (iiiii) and what sort of infringements on that right are prohibited?
Professor Reynolds attempts to answer these questions in his recent article on the Second
Amendment. Reynolds, supra note 76, at 464. Recognizing that the Second Amendment
confers a fundamental right to private ownership of firearms does mean that government
regulation is impossible. Under the standard model theory, possession of firearms would
be limited to "virtuous citizens" who demonstrate their virtuosity by employing the
"defensive use of arms against criminals, oppressive officials, and foreign enemies alike."
Id. at 480 (citing Don B. Kates, Handgun Prohibitionand the OriginalMeaning of the
Second Amendment, 82 MICH. L. REV. 204, 259 (1983)). Kates notes that under classical
republican political philosophy, "the concept of a right to arms was inextricably tied to that
of the 'virtuous citizen'" and consequently, that "free and republican institutions were
believed to be dependent on civic virtu which, in turn, depended upon each citizen being
armed-and therefore, fearless, self-reliant, and upright." Id. Consequently, the
nonvirtuous citizen could be denied the right to possess firearms. For example, convicted
felons, because of their documented unlawful behavior, would be considered nonvirtuous,
and thus, ineligible for private ownership of firearms. Convicted felons generally do not
enjoy the right to vote, at least until that right is reinstated by state or federal officials.
Thus if the constitutional privilege of voting is withheld based on a felony conviction, then
prohibiting ownership of firearms by convicted felons could logically be banned as well.
Furthermore, minors could also be precluded from ownership of firearms. First, it could
be argued that children, due to their tender age and lack of maturity, lack the requisite
virtuosity necessary to own firearms. Second, a minors lack of maturity would increase the
likelihood that firearms would be used irresponsibly, and thus implicate threats to public
health and safety sufficient to prohibit ownership. In this context, the mentally ill,
mentally impaired, and those suffering from mental infirmities sufficient to demonstrate
an inability to responsibly exercise the right to own firearms could be prohibited from
owning such weapons.
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in the hands of the people. Militia activists point to the Second
Amendment as the basis for their right to create and maintain citizen
militia units.8 9 The standard model theory asserts that the Framers
drafted the Second Amendment to insure that the general citizenry could
defend itself against a tyrannical government.' For example, James
Madison considered a standing army a threat to liberty that would be
countered by "a militia amounting to near a half a million citizens with
arms in their hands."
Similarly, Patrick Henry, a staunch antifederalist, stated that "[tihe great object is that every man be armed...
[e]very one who is able may have a gun.' 2 While it is common
knowledge that the Framers divided federal authority into three
branches of government, and further divided political power by granting
sovereign powers to the various states, under the standard model theory,
power is further divided by ensuring that the citizenry possesses
adequate military power to offset that of the federal government.9
Professor Reynolds and Commander Olson (Michigan militia) share,
at least in part, an interpretation of the Second Amendment echoed by
our founding fathers. For example, Olson remarked, during testimony
before the Senate Subcommittee on Crime, that the federal government
was the child of the armed citizen and that due to federal encroachment
into the lives of American citizens "parental corrective action" was
necessary.' Similarly, Professor Reynolds notes that "[i]f the federal
and state governments are merely agents of the people, it is logical that
the people would be reluctant to surrender a monopoly on military power
to their servants, for fear that,their servants might someday become
their masters."'5
The text of the Second Amendment is also supportive of the standard
model's assertion that it provides citizens with an individual and
collective right to keep and bear arms. First, the Amendment's opening
clause is an express reference to the security of a free state-not the

89. The Second Amendment reads: "A well regulated Militia, being necessary to a free
state, the right of the people to keep and bear arms, shall not be infringed." U.S. CONST.
amend. II.
90. Additionally, the Second Amendment was adopted to provide individuals with
protection from ordinary criminals. Glenn Harlan Reynolds, A CriticalGuide to the Second
Amendment, 62 TENN. L. REV. 461, 467 (1995).
91. Id. at 468 (citing THE FEDERALIST No. 46, at 299 (James Madison) (Willmore
Kendall & George W. Carey eds., 1966)).
92. Id. at 469 (citing 1 THE JEFFERSON CYCLOPEDIA 318 (John P. Foley ed., Russell &

Russell 1967) (1900)).
93. Id. at 469.
94. See supra note 1.
95. Reynolds, supra note 76, at 470 (citing Sanford Levinson, The EmbarrassingSecond
Amendment, 99 YALE L.J. 637, 651 (1989)).
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state." Second, the words "a well regulated militia" refer to a well
trained and equipped force competent in the handling and use of their
particular firearms-not a force that is subject to extensive government
regulation." Finally, the right enumerated in the Second Amendment
is the "right of the people to keep and bear arms"--not a right to belong
to the militia."" The fact that the Second Amendment expressly states
"the right of the people ...shall not be infringed" lends credibility to the
conclusion the Second Amendment embraces an individual right to keep
and bear arms. Furthermore, Because the First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth,
Ninth, and Tenth Amendments confer individual rights, the Second
Amendment should be read in conjunction with its sister Amendments
to confer an individual right. Notably, the Supreme Court in United
States v. Verdugo-Urquidez," stated that the Second Amendment's
reference to "the people" should be read in the same manner as in the
First, Fourth, and other Amendments. 1' °
A recent article documenting the history of the Second Amendment
reveals that Federalists and Antifederalists alike perceived a tyrannical
government as the main danger to the republic. In fact, both sides
agreed that the people had a right to be armed because the existence of
an armed populace was necessary to preserve liberty. 1 The Framers
feared that a standing army-armed and created by, as well as loyal to,
the federal government-would ultimately disarm the citizenry in
general, thus paving the way for a tyrannical government to impose its
will upon a defenseless constituency."° Alternatively, if an individual
right to keep and bear arms is not found to exist within the Second
Amendment, private ownership of handguns and other firearms could be

96. Id. at 473 (quotations omitted). Professor Reynolds argues that the use of the
term free state in lieu of the state indicates that "the purpose of the Second Amendment is
to ensure an armed citizenry, from which can be drawn the type of militia that is necessary
to the survival of a free state." Id. (emphasis added).
97. Id. at 474.
98. Id. at 472 (citations omitted). Conversely, critics of an individual right to keep and
bear arms assert that the phrase "a well regulated militia, being necessary to the security
of a free state" indicates that no individual right was granted. Id. The fundamental
distinction appears to be whether "well regulated militia" qualifies the "right of the people
to keep and bear arms" or vice versa. Reynolds notes that the concept of a well regulated
militia is "subordinate to the purpose of having an armed citizenry." Id. at 473 (citations
omitted).
99. 494 U.S. 259 (1990).
100. Id. at 265. See also Brief for Appellant at 29-34, United States v. Wright (11th
Cir. 1995) (No. 95-8397). See infra note 104 and accompanying text.
101. Vandercoy, The Historyof the Second Amendment, 28 VAL. U. L. REV. 1007, 1027
(1994).
102. Id. at 1028-29.
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prohibited. In fact such an argument was recently made before the
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals.
In United States v. Wright, 3 the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals
will rule on a Second Amendment challenge to a conviction for possession of two machine guns and three pipe bombs. The defendant,
claiming membership in a North Georgia citizen militia, argues that (i)
his possession of those weapons was reasonably related to a well
regulated militia and would have the effect of promoting the efficiency
that militia, and consequently (ii) that his possession of said weapons is
protected under the theory that the Second Amendment confers an
individual right to keep and bear arms."° Conversely, United States
Attorney Kent B. Alexander argued that the Second Amendment confers
no individual right to bear arms.' Alexander conceded, when pressed
during oral argument, that his reading of the Second Amendment would
allow Congress to ban even handguns."
The citizen militia movement's concern (and that espoused by the Founding Fathers) that the
federal government may attempt to disarm the general public does not
seem so far fetched in light of Mr. Alexander's interpretation of the
Second Amendment.
The most recent, and most often quoted Supreme Court case on the
Second Amendment is United States v. Miller."7 In Miller, the Court
considered whether the possession of a sawed off shotgun was a "militia
weapon" protected by the Second Amendment. Ultimately, the case was
remanded with instructions for further evidentiary proceedings to
determine if the shotgun had some "reasonable relationship to the
preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia.""~ From the
Court's holding it appears that Mr. Miller's claim of Second Amendment
protection was taken seriously, otherwise the Court would not have
remanded the case for further proceedings. If the Court had concluded
that the Second Amendment applied only to the states, the case could

103. No. 95-8397 (11th Cir. filed September 5, 1995). Oral arguments were heard on
October 23, 1995 before a three judge panel consisting of Judges Emmett R. Cox, Phyllis
A. Kravitch, and Senior Judge Thomas A. Clark.
104. Brief for Appellant at 4-6, United States v. Wright, (11th Cir. 1995) (No. 95-8397)
(emphasis added).

105. Brief for Appellees, at ii, 33, United States v. Wright (11th Cir. 1995) (No. 958397).
106. Don J. DeBenedictis, Second Amendment Arguments Crowd Out Commerce Clause,
FULTON COUNTY DAILY REPORT, Oct. 24, 1995 at 1.

107. 307 U.S. 174 (1939).
108. Id. at 178. Arguably, citizen militia groups constitute a well trained, well
organized body that utilizes weapons typically military in nature.
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easily have been disposed of with the simple inquiry--"Is Mr. Miller a
state?"10 9
Subsequent cases have not done justice to the Court's holding in
Miller. For example, in Vietnamese Fisherman'sAss'n, the district court
distorted the holding in Miller by adding the words "organized by the
state""0 to the phrase "reasonable relationship to the preservation or
efficiency of a well regulated militia.""' Essentially, the district court
limited application of the Second Amendment to militia groups that are
authorized, regulated, and formed by the states. Furthermore, the
district court's interpretation of the Second Amendment rejects the
notion that the Amendment confers an individual right of the people to
keep and bear arms. Miller made no such qualifications on the phrase
"well regulated militia." Conversely, the court in Vietnamese Fisherman's Ass'n adopted what has been referred to as the "states' right"
theory of the Second Amendment." 2
The "states' right" theory can be attacked on several grounds. First,
state militias do not provide protection to the general citizenry against
federal military might because state militias are ultimately subject to
Furthermore, the states rights
federal authority and control."'
argument has been used to disarm minority groups who would claim
Second Amendment challenges to laws seeking to prohibit their
possession of firearms." 4 Professor Reynolds notes that "[tihe states'

109.

See Reynolds, supra note 76, at 500. Reynolds suggests that, in taking Mr.

Miller's claim seriously, the Court recognized "some sort of individual right to keep and
bear arms." Id.
110. Vietnamese Fisherman'sAss'n, 543 F. Supp. at 210.
111. United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178 (1939) (citations omitted).
112. The states' right theory asserts that the Second Amendment protects the right of
the States to have a well regulated militia. Reynolds, supra note 76, at 488. See also
United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1833) (the right to bear arms rests solely with
the State); United States v. Warin, 530 F.2d 103 (6th Cir. 1976) (Second Amendment
guaranteed collective rather than individual right); United States v. Oakes, 564 F.2d 384,
387 (10th Cir. 1977) (Miller establishes that the purpose of the Second Amendment was
to preserve the effectiveness and assure continuation of the state militia); United States
v. Hale, 978 F.2d 1016 (8th Cir. 1016) (Second Amendment does not protect individual
possession of military weapons). Professor Reynolds points out that in Cruikshank, the
Court held that the First Amendment as well as the Second Amendment was inapplicable
to the States. He goes on to note that reliance on Cruikshank for the proposition that the
Second Amendment applies only to congress requires an explanation as to why the First
Amendment was subsequently applied to the States while the Second Amendment
continues to remain unincorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment. Reynolds, supra note
76, at 496-97.
113. Reynolds, supra note 76, at 488-90.
114. Id. at 494-96. In the early 1900s New York passed a handgun licensing act known
as the SulliuanLaw. Ultimately, over seventy percent of those arrested under its ban were
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rights argument was never meant to be taken seriously; it was always
simply a justification for statutes aimed
at disarming [perceived]
115
untrustworthy segments of our society."
In response to assertions that the Second Amendment confers a
collective right to form citizen militias, critics of the militia movement
argue that the ballot box is the proper forum for American citizens to
respond to unfair, and allegedly unconstitutional, government practices.
But the ballot box argument ignores the fact that while the Framers of
the Constitution created the right to vote, they also drafted the Second
Amendment for the purpose of ensuring that the citizenry would be
armed to protect itself against both a tyrannical form of government and
roving bands of criminals operating throughout the frontier. If the ballot
box were considered sufficient to address government injustices, why did
the Framers draft the Second Amendment with the intent that it would
grant the citizenry the right to stand in armed opposition to government
oppression?
Another popular argument of militia critics is that times have changed
since the Framers drafted, and the States ratified, the Second Amendment. Under the "times have changed" argument, the presence of a
standing army is considered sufficient to protect the citizenry against
hostile forces seeking to replace our constitutional republic with a
tyrannical and unconstitutional form of government. In response, it
must be noted that the Framers feared the creation a formidable
standing army because of the likelihood that it could be used to enforce,
not defend against, oppression. Thus, the existence of a substantial and
awesomely equipped standing army serves to validate the fear of citizen
militia groups that the government, supported by a formidable standing
army, may engage in oppressive and unconstitutional acts.
Anti-militia activists also argue that the citizen militia movement
would be incapable of prevailing in an armed conflict with governmental
forces." 6 As Professor Reynolds notes: "we do not generally require
proof of efficacy where other Constitutional rights are concerned, so it
seems a bit unfair to demand it solely in the case of the Second
Amendment."" 7
In other words, principles of free speech and
association have not been ignored simply because of a doubtful ability to
enforce First Amendment mandates, therefore the principle that the
Italian Americans. Id. at 494. Similar laws and practices were conducted throughout the
country to prohibit Asian, African American citizens from possessing firearms. Id. at 49495 (citations omitted).
115. Id. at 495.
116. Colonel Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., Revolt of the Masses: Armed Civilians and the
InsurrectionistTheory of the Second Amendment, 62 TENN. L. REV. 643, 676-77 (1995).
117. Reynolds, supra note 76, at 483.
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Second Amendment provides the citizenry with a right to arm themselves against government injustice is not defeated by the possibility
that armed resistance would be unsuccessful."'
Critics of the citizen militia movement are quick to respond that the
United States Constitution is not a suicide pact. In other words, the
framers did not intend to protect groups that seek violent overthrow of
the government they created. Most Americans would agree that radical
groups seeking, by violent means, to replace the American Republic with
anarchy, communism, or a totalitarian form of government, pose a threat
that should be swiftly and decisively quashed. But assuming that
citizen militia groups seek to defend the republic-not destroy it-their
mission and purpose would be consistent with the Framer's intent to
guard against any threat to our constitutional form of government.
Thus, under the standard model's interpretation of the Second
Amendment, citizen militia groups would enjoy constitutional protection
based on a two part theory. First, the Second Amendment embraces an
individual right to keep and bear arms. Second, because the underlying
purpose of the Amendment is to provide citizens with the ability to
defend against government oppression, a collateral right of the people to
form citizen militias would exist. Consequently, assuming that the
militia's ultimate purpose is to defend against government oppression,
the formation of a citizen army could not be labeled as criminal in and
of itself." In other words, the mere existence of an armed citizen
militia, standing ready to defend against perceived government injustice,
would not constitute unlawful conduct absent something more."
Ultimately, if citizen militia groups have a constitutionally protected
right to arm themselves in anticipation of armed conflict with domestic

118. Professor Reynolds also notes that citizen revolts in Afghanistan, Chechenia,
Chiapas Mexico, as well as in other countries have enjoyed some degree of success, Id.
119. This is not to say that the citizen militias could operate free of government
regulation. Compelling governmental interests in preserving public safety could overcome
the militia's right to arm themselves in anticipation of a tyrannical and oppressive
government. A discussion of potential government regulation into the activities of the
citizen militia movement is beyond the scope of this Comment.
120. Compare the court's language in Vietnamese Fisherman's Ass'n with the
proposition that citizen militia organizations have a constitutional right to exist:
There can be no justification for the organization of such an armed force. Its
existence would be incompatible with the fundamental concept of our form of
government. The inherent potential danger of any organized private militia, even
if ultimately placed at the disposal of the government, is obvious. Its existence
would be sufficient, without more, to prevent a democratic form of government,
such as ours, from functioning freely, without coercion, and in accordance with the
constitutional mandates.
543 F. Supp at 209 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
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or foreign forces, the question then becomes to what extent may their
speech and associational activities may be prohibited? Arguably, the
extension of Second Amendment protections to militia groups would have
a profound influence on the scope of First Amendment protections as
applied to the citizen militia movement. The next part of this comment
will attempt to address how the standard model theory would effect
application of First Amendment safeguards to the various activities of
citizen militia groups.
4. Application of First Amendment Principles of Speech and
Association in Light of the Standard Model Theory. While the
court in Vietnamese Fisherman'sAss'n noted that the defendant's were
free to express their views if communicated without the threat of
military force, the mere possession of military capabilities tainted their
freedom to associate.121 Consequently, the threat of force implicit in
the nature of citizen militia organizations-because they engage in
armed association-precludes them from invoking First Amendment
protections. Under this threat by implication theory, militia groups
cannot claim First Amendment principles of speech and association
unless they disarm. But assuming that citizen militia groups have a
constitutional right to form citizen armies, the threat by implication
theory must fail.
A.

The Right to Armed Association
The Supreme Court has noted that protecting associational activities
"is especially important in preserving and protecting political and
cultural diversity and in shieldingdissidentexpression from suppression
by the majority.""2 Conversely, government regulation of associational
activities has been upheld where the nature of the organization involved
unlawful acts of intimidation and violence." 2 But accepting, as this
comment proposes, that citizens may lawfully form citizen armies, the
association as a citizen militia constitutes the lawful exercise of a
constitutional right. Consequently, citizen militia groups may not be
prohibited on the basis of their mere association as a military organization. Because the associational ban imposes a blanket prohibition on the
legitimate and lawful activities of citizen militia organizations it

121. See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
122. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 622 (1984) (emphasis added)
(citations omitted).

123. People of the State of New York ex. rel. v. Zimmerman, 278 U.S. 63 (1928)
requiring KKK to provide list of individual members constitutional in light of nature of
KKK's activities).
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operates to restrict "legitimate political expression or association" in
contravention of the First Amendment. 12 4
Granting citizen militias the constitutional right to armed association
does not mean that such groups may operate free from government
regulation. For example, the activities of the TER in Vietnamese
Fisherman'sAss'n demonstrated specific acts of intimidation, motivated
by racial hatred, for the purpose of denying Vietnamese fishermen the
right to fish in public waterways. The TER's overt acts were unlawful
in the sense that they were aimed at denying Vietnamese fishermen the
right to earn a living by fishing in commercial waterways. Arguably, it
was unnecessary for the court to conclude that the mere existence of an
of
armed organization such as the TER was inherently unlawful in light
12
the fact that the TER's activities were unlawful on other grounds. 1
The associational ban's blanket prohibition constitutes an impermissible restriction on associational activities for another reason. Specifically,
the ban prohibits association as a military unit, in the privacy of ones
home or on private property. It is important to note that the court in
Vietnamese Fisherman'sAss'n initially concluded that the Texas Statute
prohibited "only military organizations operating within a town or city"
but subsequently reversed itself holding that "the city or town limitation
applies only to public parading with firearms."1 2' The court credited
briefs, presumably provided by the appellees, for its change in position,
but neglected to indicate specifically why it was swayed to read the "city
or town" requirement out of the first prong of the statutory prohibition."2 Allowing citizen militia groups to conduct activities on private
property would diminish, if not eliminate, the covert threat of violence
demonstrated by the TER in Vietnamese Fisherman's Ass'n. For
example, armed training activities, conducted on remote and private
property, would not be subject to view by the general public, and the

124. Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11, 15 (1966) (citing Scales v. United States, 367
U.S. 202, 229 (1961)).
125. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants violated their rights under 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1981, 1985-86; the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution; 15 U.S.C §§ 1 & 2 (Sherman Act); 15 U.S.C §§ 15 & 26 (Clayton Act); 18
U.S.C. §§ 1962 & 1964 (RICO), in addition to the alleged violation of the Texas Statute.
Thus the TER's activities were in violation of various federal civil statutes, as well as
constituting an unlawful breach of peace.
126. 543 F. Supp. at 217 n.22. As noted in this comment supra, the second prong of
the associational ban, as construed by the district court, makes the second prong of the

associational ban meaningless. Consequently, the city/town limitation disappears from
operation of the associational ban.
127. Id.
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possibility that such activities would intimidate or injure innocent
bystanders would be eliminated.
The standard model's influence on constitutional principles of free
speech is also significant in the context of the associational ban's blanket
prohibition. For example, if citizen militia groups may lawfully engage
in armed association, what effect does the advocacy of violence have on
their constitutional right to exist? To answer this question requires a
discussion of existing precedent outlining the parameters of constitutionally protected speech.
B. The Imminent Lawless Action StandardRevisited
Proponents of the associational ban point out that citizen militia
groups advocate violence as a means to achieve their stated purpose(s).
In his written brief of oral testimony, provided to members of the House
Subcommittee on Crime, Gregory T. Nojeim (Legislative Counsel for the
ACLU, Washington National Office) counters with a strong response to
such concerns:
Potential responses to anti-government groups should start with what
we call First Principles: the First Amendment protects speech. It
protects provocative speech. It protects racist speech. It even protects
advocacy of violence, provided that such advocacy does not cross the
line into incitement to imminent lawless action.'"
In Brandenburg v. Ohio'29 the Supreme Court held that Ohio's
Criminal Syndicalism Act was unconstitutional because "by its own
words and as applied, [it] purports to punish mere advocacy and to
forbid, on pain of criminal punishment, assembly with others merely to
advocate [a] described type of action." 3 ' In Brandenburg, a leader of
a Ku Klux Klan group was convicted under Ohio's Criminal Syndicalism
Act for "advocat[ing] the duty, necessity, or propriety of crime, or
unlawful methods of terrorism as a means of accomplishing... political
reform and for voluntarily assembl[ing] with any society, group or
assemblage of persons formed to teach or advocate the doctrines of
criminal syndicalism.""' The evidence adduced at trial revealed that
the a television crew was allowed to film two Klan rallies. During these
rallies several racist statements were made concerning Jews and African
128. Nojeim Brief of Oral Testimony, at 1-2, submitted to The Nature and Threat of
Violent Anti-Government Groupsin America, 1995, Subcomm. on Crime, House Comm. on
the Judiciary, 104th Cong., lst Sess., Nov. 2, 1995 (statement of Gregory T. Nojeim,
Legislative Counsel, ACLU Washington Natl Office) [hereinafter Nojeim Brief].
129. 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
130. Id. at 449.

131. Id. at 444-45.
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Americans. Specifically, comments were made, and captured on tape,
advocating violence against both ethnic groups." 2
The defendant appealed his conviction to the United States Supreme
Court which reversed, holding that the Act violated the First Amendment. The Court, in so holding, modified the clear and present danger
test previously applied to advocacy of violence, concluding that "constitutional guarantees of free speech.., do not permit a State to forbid or
proscribe advocacy of the use of force or law violation except where such
advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action.""s Under the Brandenburg standard, citizen militias would be
free to conduct activities that advocate the use of violence to achieve
political reform so long as such activities are not likely to produce or
incite imminent lawless action. In contrast, under associational ban
legislation, the activities of the militia group are irrelevant in the sense
that there is no analysis regarding the possibility, much less probability,
of imminent lawless action flowing from the groups activities. The mere
formation of a citizen militia group, not authorized by state or federal
authority, is prohibited. Thus, associational ban legislation would fail
to meet the Brandenburg test.
Conversely, the mere existence of an armed citizen militia could be
viewed as likely to produce or incite imminent lawless action. For
example, in Vietnamese Fisherman'sAss'n, the district court asserted
that the presence of an armed citizen group, in and of itself, would
intimidate would be opponents by the implicit threat of force inherent
in its military capabilities." Similarly, the presence of armed citizen
militias, threatening the use of force to achieve political reform, could
increase the likelihood of armed conflict and, ultimately, civil war.
However, under this line of reasoning, the possession of firearms by the
citizenry as a whole could arguably be seen as likely to incite imminent
lawless action in the sense that such citizens would have the ability to
commit acts of armed violence against the government. Moreover,
assuming that citizen militia groups have a constitutional right to exist,
the associational ban's prohibition could not be imposed on groups solely
because they constitute a citizen army.
The proper application of the Brandenburgstandard depends on how
one defines the likelihood of "imminent lawless action." Specifically,
what do the terms "imminent" and "lawless" mean?, or more to the point

132. Id. at 445-47. Statements captured on tape included; "save America... bury the
nigger, we intend to do our part, send the Jews back to Israel, nigger will have to fight for

every inch he gets from now on." Id. at 446 n.1.
133. Id. at 447 (emphasis added).
134. 543 F. Supp, at 198, 209.
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what types of behavior demonstrate "imminent" and "lawless" action?'35 Subsequent Supreme Court decisions are helpful in determining the types of speech that would fall within the realm of "directed at
or producing imminent lawless action." For example, in Healy v.
James,'3 6 the Court applied the Brandenburg standard holding that a
state college impermissibly rejected a group of students' request to form
an association known as "Students for a Democratic Society." The Court
reasoned that, even though the group advocated disruption and violence
on a national level, an "undifferentiated fear or apprehension of
disturbance" was insufficient to justify rejection of the groups application.'37 Additionally, in Hess v. Indiana"s the Court held that the
mere "tendency to lead to violence" was insufficient to impose criminal
sanctions unless the threat of violence was imminent.3 " When
reading Brandenburgin conjunction with James and Healy, advocacy of
violence does not meet the Brandenburgstandard on the basis of (i) an
undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance, or (ii) the mere
tendency to lead to violence. Thus, assuming that the militia's ultimate
aim is to be prepared for acts of violence directed specifically at them,
or alternatively against the citizenry as a whole, the likelihood that their
existence will incite or produce imminent lawless action is doubtful.
For example, citizen militia leaders assert that their weapons would
be used for defensive purposes only. By acknowledging that citizen
militia organizations have the inherent constitutional right to exist
under the Second Amendment, their presence alone could not be used as
the basis for an assumption that violence was imminent. In other words,
a distinction must be made between being imminently prepared for
violence and engaging in activities that are likely to incite or produce
imminently violent or otherwise unlawful behavior. Consequently,
absent expressions advocating specific and unprovoked acts of violence
by militia groups, the threat of imminent lawless action would be too
nebulous to meet the Brandenburg standard.
Additionally if citizen militia groups advocated specific and offensive
acts of violence under circumstances other than to defend against
physical force, they would not only be engaging in acts likely to incite
imminent lawless action-they could be guilty of criminal conspiracy.
Arguably, government officials could seek criminal sanctions based on
135. It must be noted that under the standard model theory, the mere armed
association as a military unit would not constitute "lawless action." Compare supra note
119 and accompanying text.
136. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
137. Id. at 508.
138. 414 U.S. 105 (1993).
139. Id. at 109.
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conspiracy law in lieu of associational ban legislation. 140 The determination of whether specific and offensive acts of violence were advocated,
or alternatively, if the accused citizen militia organization acted in self
defense, would be left for the trier of fact to decide.
In some cases individual members of citizen militia groups may
engage in unconstitutional and thus unlawful forms of speech such as
"fighting words."' 4 Members engaging in this provocative form of
speech could be held personally liable for the consequences flowing from
their inciteful rhetoric, however liability Would not necessarily be
imputed to all members of the particular citizen militia group. For
example, in NAACP v. Clairborne Hardware Co.'42 black citizens of
Port Gibson Mississippi provided white elected officials with specific
demands to address alleged racial inequalities existing in the community. In retaliation for what black citizens considered an inadequate
response to their demands, a boycott of white merchants in the area was
planned and executed. To enhance the boycotts effectiveness "store
watchers" and persons known as the "Black Hats"'" acted as boycott
enforcers by engaging in acts of intimidation against black citizens that
ignored the boycott.'"
As a result, white merchants sought damages flowing from the boycott,
alleging in part that the boycott was tainted by the presence of violent
and intimidating acts directed at black citizens who would not have
honored the boycott otherwise. The Court held that individuals
engaging in unlawful acts could be held personally liable but refused to
extend liability to the NAACP and the bulk of black citizens that
participated in the boycott. The Court noted that:
A massive and prolonged effort to change the social, political, and
economic structure of a local government cannot be characterized as a
violent conspiracy simply by reference to the empheral consequences

of relatively few violent acts.

Such a characterization must be

supported by findings that adequately disclose the evidentiary basis for

140. Because associational ban legislation typically carries a penalty of one year or less,
criminal conspiracy laws, and the substantially greater sanctions they impose, would be
preferable as a means to punish militia groups that engage in such acts.
141. See supra note 62.
142. 458 U.S. 886 (1981).

143. These individuals allegedly engaged in acts of violence against black citizens who
did not honor the boycott. Testimony revealed that (i) in two instances shots were fired at
a house, (ii) a brick was thrown through a windshield, (iii) a flower garden was damaged,
(iiii) and one person was beaten. All of these alleged acts of violence were directed at black
citizens who continued to purchase goods from white business that were subject to the
boycott. Id. at 897, 904-05.
144. Id.
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concluding that specific parties agreed to use unlawful means, that
carefully identify the impact of such unlawful conduct, and that
recognize the importance of avoiding the imposition of punishment for
constitutionally protected activity. The burden of demonstrating that
fear rather than protected conduct was the dominant force in the
movement is heavy. A court must be wary of a claim that the true
color of a forest is better revealed by reptiles hidden in the weeds than
by the foliage of countless freestanding trees. 45
The court noted that the taint of violence, while coloring the conduct of
some participants in the boycott, did not taint the collective efforts of the
defendants simply by proving that violence4 occurred, or even that
violence contributed to the boycott's success.1 6
The Brandenburg standard must be read in conjunction with
Clairborne in order to justify a blanket prohibition on speech and
associational activities. For example, in order to prohibit the collective
exercise of constitutionally protected speech and association, it must be
established that (i) the alleged activities implicated imminent lawless
action (Brandenburg),and (ii) the use of violence and/or intimidation
was sufficient to taint the collective effort of all members (Clairborne).47 But the associational ban operates to prohibit the formation
of citizen militias irrespective of (i) the likelihood that armed association
as a citizen militia would incite or produce imminent lawless action, and
(ii) absent a determination that the unlawful behavior tainted the
collective efforts of the entire movement. Consequently, officials seeking
to enforce the associational ban would be unable to meet either the
Brandenburg or Clairbornestandard."
Under the Brandenburgand Clairbornestandards the mere existence
of an armed citizen militia could not, by itself, pose a threat to public
safety sufficient to justify the associational ban's blanket prohibition.
Absent specific unlawful acts attributable to militia members, the
associational ban operates to impose guilt by association. Furthermore,

145. Id. at 933-34.
146. Id. at 933.
147. This is true because associational ban legislation would punish all members of a
particular citizen militia individually, but' not for individual acts. In other words, the
associational ban is a membership crime that imposes criminal sanctions for nothing more
than belonging to a citizen militia group.
148. In NAACP v. Patterson the Supreme Court recognized the relationship between
freedoms of speech and assembly stating "Effective advocacy of both public and private
points of view,particularlycontroversialones, is undeniably enhanced by group association,
as this Court has more than once recognized by remarking upon the close nexus between
the freedoms of speech and assembly." 357 U.S. 449 (1958). Arguably, the language in

Pattersonadds further support for the proposition that citizen militia groups are entitled
to constitutional protection.
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as previously noted in this comment, if citizen militia groups planned or
engaged in offensive and unprovoked acts of violence, state prosecutors
could seek criminal sanctions under alternative criminal or civil statutes.
Thus, the associational ban would be unnecessary to address the
unlawful activities of citizen militia groups.
In summary, the associational ban is unconstitutional for several
reasons. First it offends First Amendment principles of speech and
association by (i) restricting the free exercise of speech without requiring
that the targeted speech is likely to incite or produce imminent lawless
action, and (ii) imposing criminal sanctions on the mere association as
a citizen militia absent the presence of unlawful and intimidating acts
that taint the collective efforts of the movement as a whole. Second, the
associational ban offends the Second Amendments guarantee that "the
right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed," by
imposing criminal sanctions on the exercise of the citizen militia
movement's constitutional right to keep and bear arms in an attempt to
defend against unconstitutional and oppressive government conduct.
Finally, associational ban legislation is unconstitutionally overbroad and
vague because it does not adequately define "military organization," and
as such (i) fails to give notice of the types of conduct deemed unlawful,
and (ii) provides law enforcement with excessive discretion in the
application of its prohibitions.
6. Enforcement Concerns. Even though the associational ban
exists in Georgia, enforcement has been either very discreet or nonexistent. It cannot be said that the apparent paucity of enforcement is due
to a lack of opportunity. At least three militia groups have been
documented in Georgia, 4 9 and my research has revealed that perhaps
as many as five such groups are currently in operation. Moreover, the
citizen militia conference held in Macon, Georgia last November was
aggressively advertised and covered by the local media, giving law
enforcement agencies ample opportunity to respond. At the conference,
Bob Starr, militia activist and conference organizer, was conspicuously
dressed in a uniform of the Regional Georgia Militia. If any local or
federal law enforcement agents were present at the meeting they did not
identify themselves or otherwise interfere with conference activities.
There may be good reasons for law enforcements lack of response.
Perhaps the fact that Georgia's associational ban makes such activity
a misdemeanor offense explains the tendency not to enforce its
provisions i.e. the penalty for violation of the ban is overshadowed by the
consequences of enforcing its prohibitions. It is also possible that local
149. Kianwatch Report, supra note 16, at 8-9.
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authorities are tolerant of, if not sympathetic to, the patriotic tenor of
the movement. More likely however, is the possibility that efforts to
enforce the prohibition on unauthorized military organizations have
taken a (temporary) back seat to efforts to gather intelligence on the
various militia groups operating throughout the state and country.
Regardless of the reasons for failure to currently enforce the associational ban, militia activists continue to ignore such laws claiming them
to be unconstitutional. The reluctance to enforce the ban on unauthorized military organizations tends to legitimize their existence and will
make enforcement difficult. If and when enforcement of the associational ban is attempted, it is sure to cause violent reaction from
advocates of and participants in the citizen militia movement.
The InstructionalBan
In addition to the associationalban on unauthorized militia groups,
several states have enacted a ban on the training of individuals for
paramilitary purposes. The federal government has enacted similar
legislation known by its short title as the "Civil Disobedience Act of
1968."'" Additionally, the ADL has drafted a model instructional ban
statute known as the "Anti Paramilitary Training Statute (ADL
The ADL Statute was modeled after the Civil DisobediStatute)."'
ence Act, and provides a typical example of what I have referred to as
the instructionalban. Consequently, the ADL Statute will provide the
basis for an analysis of the types of conduct prohibited under instructional ban legislation. The ADL Statute states in pertinent part:
B.

Whoever teaches or demonstrates to any other person the use, application, or making of any firearm, explosive, or incendiary device, or
technique capable of causing injury or death to persons, knowing, or
having reason to know or intending that same will be unlawfully
of, a civil disorder ... shall be
employed for use in, or in furtherance
15 2
fined or imprisoned or both.

150. See 18 U.S.C. § 231-233 (1994). This legislation was enacted in 1968 and amended
in 1994. Violation of its provisions is punishable by imprisonment for up to five years or
a fine or both. 18 U.S.C. § 231(a)(3).
151. ADLAnti-ParamilitaryTrainingStatute: A Response to Domestic Terrorism,The

William and Naomi Gorowitz Institute on Terrorism and Extremism, at 6 (1995) (model
statute for the prohibition of paramilitary training) [hereinafter ADL Statute]. The ADL
initially proposed this model statute more than a decade ago. Because of the bombing in
Oklahoma City, the ADL has renewed efforts to seek enactment of its model statute by

state and federal legislators in an attempt to deter future acts of domestic terrorism. Id.
at 1.
152. ADL Statute, at (A)(1). Compare 18 U.S.C. § 231. The federal version of the
instructional ban legislation has additional language that could render it unconstitutional.
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The ADL statute defines civil disorder as "any public disturbance
involving acts of violence by assemblages of three or more persons, which
causes an immediate danger of or results in damage or injury to the
property or person of any other individual." 153
The instructional ban prohibits two distinct types of training. First,
it prohibits demonstrations on the use, application, or making of devices
such as firearms or bombs, if those devices are capable of causing
personal injury or death and are unlawfully used in furtherance of a
civil disorder. Second, and more broadly, the ban prohibits the teaching
of techniques that do not necessarily incorporate the use of firearms or
other weapons. Arguably, the art of hand to hand combat, if properly
applied, is capable of causing personal injury or death. Thus, the
demonstration of any technique capable of causing personal injury or
death would fall within the scope of the instructional ban's prohibition
so long as the trainer knew or intended" that the acquired training
would be used in furtherance of a public disturbance that (i) involved
acts of violence (armed or otherwise), and (ii) caused immediate danger
of personal injury or property damage.
The drafters of the ADL Statute were aware of the constitutional
implications raised by instructional ban legislation. As a result, the
ADL Statute was couched in terms of three primary objectives; (1) to
avoid violation of any constitutional guarantees (notably First Amendment and Due Process concerns), (2) to deal directly with the issue of
paramilitary training, and (3) to be narrowly drafted so as not to

Specifically, the federal statute makes paramilitary training a criminal offense if the
training is "in furtherance of, a civil disorder which may in any way or degree obstruct,
delay, or adversely affect commerce or the movement of any article or commodity in
commerce .... " Id. at (a)(1) (emphasis added). In a recent ruling by the United States
Supreme Court in United States v. Lopez, the court held that congress could regulate
__
U.S. __
certain activities if they "substantially affect[]" interstate commerce.
(1995), 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1630-31 (1995). Arguably the language "in any way or degree
obstruct, delay, or adversely affect commerce" would reach activity that does not
substantially affect interstate commerce. Because of the implications of the Lopez holding,
this comment will focus on the ADL Statute which does not contain language offensive to
its holding. See ADL Law Report: The ADL Anti.ParamilitaryTraining Statute: A
Response To Domestic Terrorism, at 4 & n.1 (recognizing the limitations placed on the
federal government's ability to prohibit paramilitary training activities in light of the
decision in Lopez).
153. ADL Statute, at (C)(1). Compare 18 U.S.C. § 232(1). The federal definition of civil
disorder is virtually identical to that of the ADL Statute.
154. The having reason to know phrase has been effectively written out of the
instructional ban's training prohibition. The rationale for removing the having reason to
know mens rea will be discussed in this Comment infra.
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prohibit legitimate lawful activities." In assessing the constitutionality of the ADL Statute's instructional ban, the drafters relied on two
federal circuit cases that held the analogous federal statute to be within
constitutional boundaries. The following is an overview of the cases
supportive of the ADL's proposed instructional ban legislation.
1. Case Law Supportive of the Instructional Ban. In National
Mobilization Committee To End The War In Viet-Nam v. Foran,5 5 the
plaintiffs were charged with teaching others in the use or making of
incendiary devices intending that the devices be unlawfully used in
furtherance of a civil disorder.157 The plaintiffs instituted a class
action suit seeking a declaratory judgment holding that section 231 of
the Civil Disobedience Act was unconstitutional on its face and as
applied."'8
Specifically, the plaintiffs based their constitutional
challenge on two grounds; (1) that section 231(a)(1) makes constitutionally protected activities such as techniques of self defense or sporting
activities unlawful, and (2) the requirement that the instructor know
whether the trainees will use their acquired skills unlawfully in
furtherance of a civil disorder is overbroad and vague.5 9 The court
concluded that the challenge to section 231(a)(1) did not pose a
"substantial constitutional question" reasoning that the knowing, having
reason to know, or intending language of section 231 "'narrows the scope
of the enactment by exempting innocent or inadvertent conduct from its
proscription.'"' 6 Arguably, the court's analysis of section 231(a)(1) is
incomplete and therefore provides questionable support for the ADL's
assertion that the model statute will survive constitutional scrutiny.
Most notably, the plaintiffs in Foranwere indicted for intending that
their teaching the use, application or making of an incendiary device be
unlawfully used in furtherance of a civil disorder. Consequently, the
court confined its analysis to intentional conduct (as alleged in the
indictment) and did not consider the implications of the phrase having
reason to know. The court rightly limited its analysis to the facts of the
155. ADL Law Report: ADL Anti-Paramilitary Training Statute: A Response to
Domestic Terrorism, The William and Naomi Gorowitz Institute on Terrorism and
Extremism, at 3 (1995) (hereinafter ADL Report].

156. 411 F.2d 934 (7th Cir. 1969).
157. Id. at 935. The plaintiffs also raised challenges to sections 2101-02. These
sections of Title 18 deal with federal charges of inciting to riot and will not be discussed
in this Comment.
158. Id. at 936-37.

159. Id. at 938. Thus the plaintiffs attack on section 231(a)(1) is based on both the
First Amendment (freedom of association) and Fifth Amendment (due process void for
vagueness doctrine).
160. Id. at 937 (citing Landrey v. Daley, 280 F. Supp. 938, 939 (N.D. Ill. 1968)).
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case, however, the ADL's assertion that its model statute is justified
under the decision in Foran ignores the fact that the court did not
consider the constitutional implications of labeling conduct as criminal
under the having reasonto know standard. For example, if the plaintiffs
had been charged with having reason to know that the techniques
taught would be unlawfully used in furtherance of a civil disorder, the
government need only prove that the plaintiffs could have foreseen that
their pupils would unlawfully use the acquired knowledge in furtherance
of a civil disorder. Imposition of criminal sanctions based on a
foreseeability/negligence standard runs the risk of criminalizing innocent
or inadvertent acts contrary to the void for vagueness doctrine.' 61
Issues of vagueness flowing from the language having reason to know
were addressed in a subsequent circuit court decision.
In United States v. Featherston,"m the plaintiffs alleged that the
having reason to know language in (a)(1) "creates criminal liability in
terms so broad and vague that men of common intelligence must guess
at its meaning and application."1'3 The plaintiffs in Featherston were
members of the Black Afro Militant Movement ("BAMM"). In May 1970
members of BAMM were instructed on how to make and assemble
explosive and incendiary devices with the express purpose of preparing
for "'the coming revolution. '"' " In upholding the constitutionality of
section 231(a)(1), the court concluded that the statute requires proof that
alleged violators knew or intended that the disseminated information
would be used in furtherance of a civil disorder.'" The court noted
that virtually identical language had been similarly construed by the
United States Supreme Court in Gorin v. United States.l' The Court
in Gorin held that the delimiting language of the Act required that those
charged must act in bad faith in order for sanctions to apply.16 7 Under

161. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
162. 461 F.2d 1119 (5th Cir. 1972).
163. Id. at 1121.
164. Featherston,461 F.2d at 1121.
165. Id. at 1122 (emphasis added). The court in Featherston read the Fifth Circuit's
holding in Foranas construing section 231(a)(1) to require intentional conduct. Id. at 1121.
My reading of Foran suggests that the court did not consider possible application of the
phrase "having reason to know" as the indictment in that case alleged intentional conduct
only. Assuming that the court in Foran had construed section 231(a)(1) to require
intentional conduct, such a conclusion would have been dicta, and not an essential holding
based on the facts of the case.
166. 312 U.S. 19 (1940). The Court in Gorin considered the constitutionality of the

Espionage Act of 1917, subsequently incorporated into 18 U.S.C. § 793. The language at
issue in Gorin stated "with intent or reason to believe." Featherston,461 F.2d at 1121.
167. Gorin, 312 U.S. at 27-28. Bad faith "implies the conscious doing of a wrong
because of dishonest purpose or moral obliquity ... and contemplates a state of mind
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the construction of 18 U.S.C § 231(a)(1) provided by the court in
Featherston,having reason to know merges into knowing conducti thus
removing negligent or reckless acts from the instructional ban.
In addition to the Due Process violation alleged in Featherston, an
attack based on First Amendment grounds was raised by the plaintiffs
and rejected by the court. The Plaintiffs asserted that the statute was
unconstitutional as applied because the government failed to show "the
This chalhappening or pendency of a particular civil disorder.""
lenge refers to the clear and present danger test typically applied to
governmental prohibitions on constitutionally protected speech. The
court relied upon language from Dennis v. United States"9 for its
conclusion that the clear and present danger test does not require the
government to wait for the planned event to occur where the evidence
showed that BAMM was ready to strike transportation, communication,
and law enforcement targets at a moments notice. 70
Most recently, the Fourth Circuit has scrutinized a North Carolina
statute that tracks the language of the ADL's instructional ban. In
Person v. Miller & Carolina Knights of the Ku Klux Klan 7 ' Bobby
Person (an African American) filed a class action against the Carolina
Knights of the Ku Klux Klan (CKKKK), its leader (Glen Miller), and
other unnamed associates of the organization. Person alleged that the
defendants participated in acts of violence and intimidation aimed at
preventing black citizens (and sympathizers) from exercising their rights
under applicable state and federal law. A class consisting of all black
citizens of the State of North Carolina was certified, and in January
1985 a consent decree was joined by the parties prohibiting the CKKKK
from "'operat[ing] as a paramilitary organization and do[ing] other acts

affirmatively operating with furtive design or will." Black's Law Dictionary 127 (5th ed.
1979).
168. 461 F.2d at 1122.
169. 341 U.S. 494 (1951). The relied upon language states:
[Tihe words [clear and present danger] cannot mean that before the government
may act, it must wait until the putsch is about to be executed, the plans have been
laid and the signal is awaited. If government is aware that a group aiming at its

overthrow is attempting to indoctrinate its members and attempt to commit them
to a course whereby they will strike when the feel the circumstances permit,
action by the government is required.

Id. at 509.
170. Featherston,461 F.2d at 1122. The court also noted that BAMM was a "cohesive
and organized group ... [consisting of] a force regularly trained in explosives and
incendiary devices." Id. The court subsequently held that "there was a sufficient showing
of clear and present danger to justify governmental intervention .... " Id. at 1123.
171. 854 F.2d 656 (4th Cir. 1988).
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This case is of little
prohibited by North Carolina Statutes . . . . "
value for purposes of construing the constitutionality of instructional ban
legislation because Miller based his appeal on the ground that there was
insufficient evidence to establish a violation of the North Carolina
Statutes. 17 Thus, the court did not address potential constitutional
challenges based on First Amendment freedoms of speech and association.
Instructional ban legislation has so far survived constitutional
challenges based on First Amendment principles of assembly and
association. The statutory prohibition has also survived void for
vagueness challenges based on the Due Process Clause. 174 There are
however, constitutional implications associated with the instructional
ban's application to citizen militia groups that are worthy of mention.
2. Criticisms and Constitutional Concerns. Ultimately, the
constitutionality of instructional ban legislation hinges on two separate
issues. First, what part does the Second Amendment play in protecting
armed citizen militia organizations from government intervention into
their training activities? Second, what effect does the Brandenburg
standard exert over the instructional ban's application to the conduct of
armed groups that (i) espouse anti-government rhetoric, and (ii) engage
in training activities designed to enhance their proficiency, and
ultimately their ability, to engage in armed conflict with governmental
forces?
A.

The Second Amendment and the InstructionalBan

This Comment proposes that the Second Amendment, when read in
tandem with First Amendment principles of free speech and association,

North Carolina Statute § 14-288.20(b(1) incorporates the
172. Id. at 658-59.
instructional ban language of the ADL Statute. The court determined that Miller was in
violation of the instructional ban under an agency theory. Id. at 661. Specifically, the
court found that Miller's cohorts conducted weapons and tactics training, in preparation
for Miller's plan to overthrow the government. Id. at 660.
173. Id. at 660.
174. Several states have enacted instructional ban legislation that includes the phrase
having reason to know. To make the instructional ban consistent with the court's

interpretation of identical language in Featherstonand Gorin, States should remove the
phrase having reason to know, thus making the ban consistent with Title 18 § 231. The
instructional ban has been read to require knowing or intentional conduct. Consequently,
the phrase having reason to know has been read out of 18 U.S.C. § 231(a)(1). Deleting the
offensive language would ensure that prosecutors seeking to enforce the instructional ban
would not mistakenly apply a negligence standard to an alleged wrongdoers state of mind.
Removing the having reason to know mental state would also serve to avoid constitutional
challenges based on the "void for vagueness" doctrine.
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qualifies the scope of instructional ban legislation. By acknowledging
that the Second Amendment recognizes an individual right to keep and
bear arms, and further acknowledging that the underlying policy of that
right is to provide citizens with the ability to defend against tyrannical
and unconstitutional government practices, the instructional ban is
substantially limited in its scope and application.
For example, training activities designed to enhance the proficiency of
individual militia units would be protected under the standard model's
assertion that the policy underlying the Second Amendment right to
keep and bear arms is to provide an avenue for the people to defend
themselves against government oppression. In order for citizen militia
groups to provide (i) a bona fide check on government oppression, and
(ii) protect and preserve our constitutional form of government, they
must be receive adequate military training. Otherwise, by allowing the
instructional ban to prohibit the militia's training activities, the
movement would be incapable operating as a viable defensive force.
Consequently, the purpose underlying the Second Amendment -the right
of the citizenry to stand in opposition to unfair government practices-would be undermined. 17 5
Moreover, the Second Amendment, as interpreted under the "standard
model theory," recognizes that citizen groups may lawfully arm
themselves in anticipation of armed conflict with oppressive and
tyrannical governmental forces. Consequently, the instructional ban
cannot prosecute alleged violators on the assertion that the paramilitary
training of militia members, for the purpose of defending against
government tyranny, is unlawful in and of itself. Essentially, a
successful prosecution under the instructional ban would require a
showing that the trainer knew or intended that the training would be
used to further an imminent threat of violence that was prosecutable
under an alternative criminal or civil statute.
For example, in United States v. Nichols171 the defendant is charged
with (i) aiding and abetting the commission of a crime of violence, and
(ii) maliciously damaging and destroying by means of fire and explosive
a building, vehicle, and other personal and real property in whole or in
part owned, possessed and used by the United States. 7 7 Assuming,

175. Furthermore, allowing armed citizen militias to exist yet prohibiting them from
being adequately trained in the proper handling and care of small arms would increase the
likelihood of injury or death to militia members and the public at large. Specifically, if
militia members are not trained in how to handle their weapons safely, the possibility of
accidental injury is enhanced. The right to conduct training activities is essentially a
collateralright, flowing from the Second Amendment right to create citizen armies.
176. No. M-95-105-H, 1995 WL 500306 (W.D. Okla. June 6, 1995).
177. Id. at 1.
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for the sake of argument, that Nichols conducted training with the
alleged bomber Timothy Mcveigh, for the purpose of bombing the
Murrah Building in April 1995, then Nichols would be subject to
prosecution under the instructional ban. Essentially, the "unlawfully
used in furtherance of a civil disorder" provision of the instructional ban
would be met because Nichols "aided or abetted" Mcviegh in the
commission of a crime of violence.178 Conversely, if an individual
conducted training activities on the use, application, or making of a
firearms, for the purpose of enhancing the overall proficiency of militia
members in handling such weapons, the instructional ban would not
reach his/her conduct because no underlying unlawful act could be
established.179

Advocates of the instructional ban assert that training activities
designed to enhance citizen militia group's overall ability to engage in
armed conflict with governmental forces poses a grave and imminent
danger of violence. But such an assumption would require more than
the mere abstract teaching of military techniques where the formation
of armed citizen militia groups is considered to be the exercise of
constitutional privilege under the Second Amendment. Therefore, what
types of training activities are likely to incite or produce imminent
lawless action must be defined in light of the inherent constitutional
right of the people to form citizen militia organizations.
B. The "Imminent Lawless Action" Standard and the Instructional
Ban
Application of the Brandenburg standard to the training activities of
citizen militia groups requires some clarifications as to exactly what falls
within the ban's proscriptions. Accepting that the ban requires the
trainer know or intend that the acquired knowledge be unlawfully used
in furtherance of a civil disorder, the mere teaching, without a simultaneous intent or knowledge that such training will be unlawfully used in
furtherance of a civil disorder, cannot be prosecuted. Under Brandendburg's imminent lawless action standard, the Ban's prohibition is further
qualified in the sense that the alleged civil disorder must be (i)

178. See 18 U.S.C. § 3156(4).
179. The underlying unlawful act would not be limited to criminal violations. For
example, the activities of the TER in Vietnamese Fisherman'sAss'n amounted to civil rights
violations that are both unlawful and punishable under federal law. The plaintiffs in
Vietnamese Fisherman'sAss'n alleged criminal and civil rights violations under 42 U.S.C
§§ 1981, 1985(3), 1986; 15 U.S.C. §§ 15, 26; 18 U.S.C §§ 1962, 1964.
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imminent, and (ii) likely to be incited or produced by the training
itself."s Thus, if the disseminated information did not result in the
likelihood of inciting or producing imminent lawless action, such activity
would be outside the scope of the instructional ban's prohibition.
The court in Featherstonprovides little guidance in determining the
scope the instructional ban in light of the "imminent lawless action"
standard articulated in Brandenburg. For example, the court chose to
rely on the "clear and present danger" standard articulated in Dennis in
lieu of the "imminent lawless action" standard created in Brandenburg.
While Brandenburgprotects advocacy of violence unless such advocacy
is likely to incite imminent lawless action, in Dennis the Court made no
such distinction.
In Dennis, several defendants questioned the constitutionality of the
Smith Act's' alleging that the Act violated the First and Fifth Amendments. The defendants were charged, under the Act, with knowingly
conspiring to organize a communist party while teaching and advocating
the overthrow of the United States government, by means of force and
violence. 8 2 The Court, in holding that the Act was constitutional,
reasoned that "the words [clear and present danger] cannot mean that
before the government may act, it must wait until ... the plans have
been laid and the signal is awaited."'83 Conversely, Justice Douglas'
concurrence in Brandenburgcriticizes Dennis as "opening wide the door
[to government intrusion], [while] distorting the 'clear and present
danger' test beyond recognition." Justice Douglas favored a narrow
application of the "imminent lawless" action" standard that would require
"speech [ I brigaded with action. "' Furthermore, the per curiam
opinion in Brandenburg noted that "the mere abstract teaching of the
moral propriety or even moral necessity for a resort to force and violence
is not the same as preparing a group for violent action and steeling it to
such action."" s
Arguably, the imminent lawless action standard articulated in
Brandenburgis more forgiving of advocacy of violence than the language
contained in Dennis. For example, under the Dennis standard, anti-

180. In fact the definition of "civil disorder" requires acts that cause "immediate danger
of or results in damage or injury to the property or person of any other individual." ADL
Model Statute (C)(1); 18 U.S.C § 232(1) (emphasis added). In this context, the definition
of civil disorder lends support to the proposition that the consequences of the training
activity be imminent.
181. 18 U.S.C § 2385 (1946 ed.).
182. 341 U.S. at 495-97.
183. Id. at 509.
184. Id. at 453 (Douglas, J., concurring).
185. 395 U.S. at 448 (citing Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290, 297-98 (1961)).
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government groups that conduct abstract paramilitary training
activities, but have not planned specific and imminent acts of violence
could not claim First Amendment protection. Consequently citizen
militia officials who provide abstract training to individual members in
the use and application of firearms, would be subject to instructional ban
prohibitions, including substantial fines and incarceration. Conversely,
the "imminent lawless action" standard articulated in Brandenburg
requires more than the abstract teaching of force and violence to remove
First Amendment protections. As noted previously in this comment,
when reading Brandenburg in conjunction with James and Healy,
training activities of citizen militia groups cannot be prohibited on the
basis of (i) an undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance, (ii)
the mere tendency of military training to lead to violence, or (iii)
activities that are not likely to produce or incite imminent lawless
action.
In justifying its conclusion that the training activities engaged in by
BAMM members were not constitutionally protected, the court in
Featherstonnoted that BAMM was a "cohesive and organized group...
[consisting of I a force regularly trained in explosives and incendiary
devices.""8 Furthermore, oral testimony revealed that the members
of BAMM were told to have the ingredients necessary to configure
incendiary devices in their homes in order to prepare for the "coming
revolution." Members were also told to be ready to use the devices "at
a moments notice." Finally, testimony revealed that no date had been
set for the coming revolution as trainers noted that there was "no telling
when the revolution might come."'87
On the one hand, BAMM's training in the use and application of
incendiary devices, in preparation of the coming revolution, posed a
significant threat to public safety, thus raising a potentially compelling
governmental interest sufficient to restrict (if not prohibit) their training
activities. But application of the "imminent lawless action" standard
would require a more detailed analysis than the one provided by the
circuit court in Featherston. Specifically, was the coming revolution
imminent or was the court's analysis tainted by an undifferentiated fear
or apprehension of disturbance? Moreover, did the conduct at issue in
Featherston reflect a mere tendency towards violence or conversely
indicate an imminent threat that violence would occur?'

186. 461 F.2d at 1122.
187, Id. at 1122 n.4.
188. It is in this context that the distinction between being "imminently prepared" and
"likely to incite or produce imminent acts of violence" becomes important. As noted in this
Comment supra, making such a distinction would tend to remove training activities
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The court in Featherston expressed a valid concern when noting that
governmental agencies should not be forced to wait until an actual event
of violence has occurred before responding to the threat posed by groups
such as BAMM. The fact that BAMM constituted a "cohesive and well
organized" group increased the likelihood that they would ultimately use
the knowledge acquired during training sessions in furtherance of their
rebellious purpose. Furthermore, members regularly engaged in training
activities designed to enhance their proficiency in the use and application of explosive devices. The frequency of training reflected a deep
commitment to prepare for the coming revolution, and thus increased the
likelihood of violence. Finally, the desire of BAMM members to respond
at "a moments notice" further demonstrated the potential for imminent
violent conduct.
Under a strict First Amendment analysis, the threshold question is
whether the training activities were likely to produce or incite imminent
lawless action? Considering the nature and extent of BAMM's activities
it is unfair to say that the court was tainted by an undifferentiated fear
or apprehension that violence was likely. However, the record does not
reflect that BAMM members had (i) set a specific date, (ii) for specific
acts of violence, (iii) directed at specific targets. Arguably, the government's compelling interest in public safety is weakened by the fact that
the threat of violence, inherent in the activities of BAMM members,
involved some degree of speculation. In other words, absent a specific
threat, to a specific target, confined to a certain time frame, the
imminent nature of a generalized threat to governmental authority
cannot be measured with a reasonable degree of certainty."l 9
Arguably, if activities of certain members of a particular citizen militia
group, or of the group as a whole, reflect the planning or execution of
specific acts of imminent violence, then operation of the instructional
ban would comply with the Brandenburgstandard. For example, if the
Oklahoma City bombing had been (i) planned by a particular citizen
militia group, (ii) with training activities designed to carry out the
unlawful act in the near future, those conducting the training would be
subject to the instructional ban's sanctions."9 On the other hand,
criminalization of the mere teaching of bomb making, absent an

designed to prepare militia members for the possibility of armed conflict from the instructional ban's training prohibition.
189. Arguably, violent acts resulting from training BAMM members in the making of

explosive devices could have been months or even years away based on the equivocal
statement "we must get our heads and minds and bodies right for the revolution, no telling
when the revolution might come." Featherston,461 F.2d at 1123 n.4.
190. They would also be punishable under a criminal conspiracy theory and subject to
substantial criminal sanctions.
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imminent threat to a specific target, makes application of the imminent
lawless action standard more problematic.
In order to square the court's analysis in Featherston with the
Brandenburg standard several assumptions must be made. First, that
anti-government groups will inevitably wage war against government
forces because they engage in rebellious rhetoric reinforced by specific
paramilitary training exercises. Second, that it is unreasonable to
require government officials to predict the pendency, nature, or target
of potential acts of violence directed against governmental authority.
Concerning the assumption that armed conflict is an inevitable
consequence of the existence of armed citizen militia groups, it is
important to define the nature of the citizen militia movement's
activities. Defining their activities demonstrates that the inevitability of
armed conflict is debatable.
Assuming that (i) the training activities of citizen militia groups are
confined to defensive preparedness, and (ii) citizen militia groups
conduct training for the purpose of defending against the potential use
of force by governmental agencies, the imminent nature of the threat of
armed conflict initiated by militia members cannot be determined. The
equivocal statement of BAMM members that there was "no telling when
the revolution might come" reveals the dilemma inherent in determining
when training activities are likely to incite imminent lawless action. If
the instructional ban were read to require proof of specific acts of
violence, directed at specific targets, within a discernible time frame,
application of the Brandenburgstandard would be relatively easy.
But requiring such particularity of proof may place an unreasonable
burden on law enforcement agencies seeking to enforce the instructional
ban. Proponents of the instructional ban point out that the covert
nature of citizen militia groups makes it difficult, if not impossible, for
law enforcement agencies to infiltrate and subsequently discover plans
for specific unlawful acts.191 Ultimately, the aim of instructional ban
advocates, as well as the ban itself, is to criminalize paramilitary
training activities that may encourage future and unspecified acts of
violence against governmental agencies."

191. Specifically, the presence of a leaderless resistance organizational scheme
(discussed in part I supra) would operate to make infiltration of citizen militia groups
extremely difficult.
192. Michael Liberman (Washington Counsel for the ADL) states that the instructional
ban (as well as the participatory ban) requires law enforcement officers prove that "the goal
of the individuals participating in these paramilitary programs is to create or foster illegal
civil disorders." Liberman, submitted to The Nature and Threat of Violent Anti.
Government Groups in America, 1995, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Crime, House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong., 1st Sess., November 2, 1995 (Statement of Michael
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As previously noted, if militia members engaged in training for specific
unlawful acts in furtherance of a civil disorder, such behavior could be
addressed under alternative federal or state criminal law. For example,
the act of planning a specific act of violence, such as the bombing of the
federal building in Oklahoma City, could be reached under a criminal

conspiracy theory" 3 And if the act was ultimately carried out, then
state and federal laws prohibiting such acts of violence could be the
basis for criminal charges. But advocates of the instructional ban want
to go one step further and create a ban that would diminish the
likelihood of violent acts against governmental agencies by prohibiting
abstract training activities.
Reasonable application of the instructional ban, in light of the
Brandenburg standard, requires a balancing of the right of citizen
militia groups to conduct training activities against the governmental
interest of protecting or enhancing public safety. Any attempt to
accommodate these competing interests, requires defining the term
"imminent" in such a way as to allow militias to engage in training
activities while recognizing that government regulation of paramilitary
training furthers a compelling governmental interest in public safety.
On the one hand, requiring that the instructor know or intend that the
training would be used to destroy or attack specific targets, arguably
imposes an impermissible restriction on the governmental interest in
public safety. On the other hand, allowing the instructional ban to
criminalize abstract paramilitary training where the acquired information would be used to imminently prepare militia members against
potential acts of violent aggression would arguably constitute an
impermissible restriction on their right to engage in defensive training
activities.
One way to resolve the conflict between the right of citizen militia
groups to train individual members and the governmental interest in
public safety is to define nondefensive acts of violence, planned or
otherwise, as (i) unlawful, and (ii) likely to incite or produce imminent
lawless action. In other words, training that was designed solely for the
purpose of defending against an actual attack by foreign or domestic
forces would be defensive in nature and outside the scope of instructional
ban legislation. Conversely, training activities that are designed to
enhance, encourage or ultimately incite nondefensive acts of violence

Liberman, Washington Counsel, ADL). Fostering civil disorders is a broad prohibition that
would not require the existence of a specific and imminent threat to a specific target.
193. Under a conspiracy theory, the overt act requirement would be met by establishing
that the instructor and participants engaged in said training for the specific purpose of
executing the bombing.

1996]

CITIZEN MILITIA MOVEMENT

631

against the Republic would be under the instructional ban's training
prohibition.
Adoption of a "nondefensive" gloss on the training activities of the
citizen militia movement would comply with both the standard model
theory's interpretation of the Second Amendment, and Brandenburg's
qualification on First Amendment principles of speech and association.
First, the right of citizen militia groups to conduct training activities
implicit in the standard model's interpretation of the Second Amendment
would be respected so long as the training was strictly defensive in
nature. Consequently, because nondefensive training activities would be
unlawful, training that encouraged, incited or produced "nondefensive"
acts of violence would meet the instructional ban's requirement that the
training be unlawfully used in furtherance of a civil disorder. Second,
the instructional ban's training prohibition would not meet the
Brandenburg standard where training activities embraced a strictly
defensive purpose. Conversely, nondefensive training activities would
pose an imminent threat of lawless action and would be subject to the
instructional ban's training prohibition.
C. The ParticipatoryBan
Several states have enacted legislation prohibiting persons from
participating in paramilitary training activities with the intent to
unlawfully use the fruits of such training in furtherance of a civil
disorder.'" The ADL Statute includes a participatory ban provision,
and will provide the foundation for discussion of participatory ban
legislation. The ADL Statute states in pertinent part:
Whoever assembles with one or more persons for the purpose of
training with, practicing with, or being instructed in the use of any
firearm, explosive or incendiary device, or technique capable of causing
injury or death to persons, intending to employ unlawfully the same for
use in, or in furtherance of, a civil disorder-Shall be fined not more
than $_

or imprisoned not more than

-

years, or both.19

While participatory ban legislation has been enacted in several states,
it has not been tested in court. Advocates of the participatory ban argue
that it is necessary to prevent planned violence against the elected
government. By analogy, the same arguments in support of the
instructional ban can be applied to the participatory ban. The fact that

194. As mentioned in this comment at note 5 supra, a bill has been introduced into the
House of Representatives to amend 18 U.S.C § 231 by incorporating a participatory ban
into the Statute. At this time the there is no federal law prohibiting such conduct.
195. ADL Statute (AX2).
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the constitutionality of the 18 U.S.C § 231 (Civil Disobedience Act) has
been upheld by the Seventh Circuit in Foran and the Fifth Circuit in
Featherston denotes the likelihood that participatory ban legislation
would survive constitutional attacks grounded on First and Second
Amendment principles.
The participatory ban is not unconstitutional on its face. Under its
provisions, the participatory ban operates to impose criminal sanctions
on individuals who (i) participate in paramilitary training designed for
an unlawful purpose, and (i) intend to use the acquired knowledge in
furtherance of the unlawful purpose. Depending on how the participatory ban is applied, it may or may not comply with constitutional
commands enumerated in the First and Second Amendments.
For example, under the standard model theory of the Second
Amendment, participation in paramilitary training for the purpose of
creating a well regulated citizen militia would not constitute unlawful
conduct. Furthermore, the participatory ban could not be applied to
citizens participating in paramilitary training for the purpose of
standing ready to defend against government oppression. Ultimately, an
underlying unlawful act, based on an alternative criminal of civil statute
would be necessary to establish a violation of the participatory ban.
Similarly, the participatory ban's restriction on associational activities
must be narrowly applied to avoid an impermissible restriction on the
associational rights of citizen militia members who participate in
paramilitary training activities. Specifically, under Clairborne,the ban
cannot operate to impose criminal sanctions on all alleged participants
in unlawfully designed training activities unless most if not all of the
trainees have adopted, and seek to further, the unlawful purpose. 19
TV. CONCLUSION
Citizen militias claim as their purpose to protect and preserve the
United States Constitution from threats, both foreign and domestic.
Militia leaders point to the Second Amendment as granting them the
collective right to form citizen armies as a means to overcome government oppression and tyranny. Moreover, militia activists view the
existence of a formidable standing army on the federal level-reinforced
by state maintained national guards-as a force capable of disarming
the American people and ultimately assisting in the imposition of an
unconstitutional form of government. Consequently, citizen militias
conduct military training activities designed to enhance their proficiency
196. See supra note 144 and accompanying text. Issues of free speech are not generally
implicated by operation of the participatory ban, and thus are not addressed in the

discussion of the participatory ban.
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as a viable military organization. Additionally, militia leaders disseminate a wide variety of anti-government/pro-militia propaganda-in the
form of written and verbal speech-to educate and recruit mainstream
America to the movement.
Several aspects of the citizen militia movement are troubling. Perhaps
most troubling is the possibility that militia leaders will instigate
violence against government forces based on subjectively determined
threats that are grounded in unsubstantiated fears and suspicions. For
example, militia units may attempt to justify attacks on government
institutions based on exotic conspiracy theories that are neither accepted
by the majority of the American public nor sufficiently documented by
credible evidence. In this sense the militia movement can be viewed as
a loose cannon lurking in the shadows of American society.
Additionally, the citizen militia movement has not been embraced by
even a simple majority of the American people. While some of the views
espoused by the militia movement are shared by the American people-namely the protection and preservation of the United States
Constitution-most Americans are not prepared to engage in armed
conflict with governmental forces. And arguably, the conduct of state
and federal officials, while the object of much debate and criticism, has
not risen to a level of discord that would justify outright rebellion.
Given the current state of affairs, the most immediate, and perhaps most
important question is how should the government deal with the
implications of the citizen militia movement. The recent standoff with
the Freemen in the remote Montana landscape is providing the federal
government with an opportunity to demonstrate that it has learned a
lesson from the recent tragedies in Waco and Ruby Ridge. The media,
and more importantly, the American public, are watching this confrontation closely.
In an effort to determine the validity of citizen militia groups, this
comment approached the issue of whether citizen militia groups, and
their activities, are constitutionally protected by adopting the standard
model theory of the Second Amendment. Essentially, the standard
model theory points to the text of the Second Amendment, the Framer's
intent when drafting and approving the Amendment, and the Supreme
Court's decision in Miller v. United States, as supportive of the
proposition that the Second Amendment was enacted to serve a twofold
purpose. First, to ensure that a fundamental right to keep and bear
arms be incorporated into the United States Constitution. And second,
that because the underlying purpose of the Second Amendment was to
provide the people with a means to defend against oppressive and
tyrannical government practices, a collective right to form citizen
militias was created to provide the people with the means to defend
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against, and ultimately eliminate, oppressive and unconstitutional
governmental acts.
On the other hand, some public officials, law enforcement agencies,
and watchdog organizations perceive the citizen militia movement, and
other alleged extremist groups, as a criminal threat to American society.
Arguing that the United States Constitution is not a suicide pact,
advocates of laws designed to eliminate citizen militias are lobbying hard
to see that associational, instructional, and participatory ban legislation
becomes the law of the land. Essentially, anti-militia groups consider
the ballot box as the proper means to exorcise oppressive and unconstitutional practices from our political system. Anti-militia groups also
point out that times have changed since the Second Amendment was
created. They advocate a dynamic interpretation of the Amendment that
would not allow the people to summon citizen armies in response to
perceived government injustice.
At the risk of oversimplification, the debate surrounding the Second
Amendment, and consequently the citizen militia movement, revolves
around how the constitution should be interpreted. If using a static
approach to interpreting the Second Amendment, its text, as well as
Framer's intent when drafting the Amendment's language, supports both
an individual and collective right of the people to arm themselves
against threats both foreign and domestic. Conversely, under a dynamic
approach, the Amendment could be considered obsolete and inapplicable
to modern day society in the sense that the formation of citizen armies
is unnecessary to preserve and maintain the Republic, and furthermore
that citizen militia groups are incapable of such a task even if allowed
to exist. The ultimate danger of adopting a dynamic approach to the
Second Amendment, thus removing protections its Framers intended to
extend to the people, is that the door will be open to interpret away
other constitutional safeguards that are expressly or implicitly contained
within the Constitution.
As the law now stands, the associational, instructional, and participatory bans may be utilized to (i) prohibit the formation of citizen militia
groups, and (ii) prohibit paramilitary training activities designed to
prepare for conflict with governmental forces. This Comment has
attempted to define the scope of associational, participatory, and
instructional ban legislation in light of federal district and circuit court
decisions construing the associational and instructional bans.1"
Arguably, courts construing these bans have been less than fair in their
treatment of constitutional challenges based on the First and Second

197, As noted in this Comment supra, the participatory has not been judicially
construed.
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Amendments, as well as the Due Process Clause. Additionally, courts
construing the associational and instructional bans rejected an
interpretation of the Second Amendment that would recognize a
collective right to form citizen militias. From a constitutional perspective, the scope of associational ban legislation suffers from numerous
infirmities. For example, the associational ban criminalizes mere
association as a military unit not authorized by state or federal law.
The ban does not require the association to be armed. The ban prohibits
associational activities on private land. The ban, in most jurisdictions,
does not define "military organization." The ban does not give persons
of ordinary intelligence fair notice that their contemplated conduct is
unlawful. The ban encourages arbitrary and erratic arrests and
convictions. The ban operates to prohibit the formation of citizen militias
irrespective of the likelihood that the association as a citizen militia
would incite or produce imminent lawless action. The ban imposes a
blanket prohibition on all members of the military organization absent
a determination that unlawful behavior tainted the collective efforts of
the entire organization.
For all of the reasons stated in the preceding paragraph, the associational ban is unconstitutional on its face. It is important to note that,
with the exception of the ban's self proclamation that formation of
citizen armies is unlawful in and of itself, the remaining restrictions are
unconstitutional even if the collective right to form citizen militias is not
found in the Second Amendment. On the other hand, the instructional
and participatory bans are not facially unconstitutional, but both run the
risk of being unconstitutional as applied. Assuming, as this comment
proposes, that the Second Amendment confers a collective right to form
citizen militias, the scope of the instructional and participatory bans is
substantially limited.
For example, defensive paramilitary training activities designed to
prepare for an attack by oppressive government forces would be
considered the lawful exercise of a constitutional right implicit in the
Second Amendment. As a result, in order for the instructional or
participatory bans to be constitutionally applied, an underlying unlawful
act, based on existing civil or criminal statutes, must be established to

satisfy the requirement that the trainer/trainee know or intend that the
training be unlawfully used in furtherance of a civil disorder. Conversely, if the formation of citizen armies is not under the umbrella of Second
Amendment protections, training designed to prepare for potential
attack by government forces would be considered unlawful, and thus
meet the requirement that the trainer/trainee know or intend that the
training be unlawfully used in furtherance of a civil disorder.
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Furthermore, in the context of the advocacy of violence, it is necessary
that the instructional ban comply with Brandenburg'simminent lawless
action standard. For example, speech or associational activities cannot
be characterized as likely to incite or produce imminent lawless action
on the basis of (i) an undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance, or (ii) the mere tendency to lead to violence. While the training
of militia members to prepare for potential attack by government forces
arguably has a tendency to lead to violence, such training activities are
insufficient to implicate imminent lawless action. Ultimately, the critical
distinction to be made is that being imminently prepared for offensive
attack by government forces would not be likely to incite or produce
imminent lawless action, while engaging in training activities that are
for purposes other than to defend against potential government attack
would be likely to do so.
Moreover, the participatory ban is further qualified by the Supreme
Court's decision in NAACP v. Clairborne. Ultimately, participants in
alleged unlawful paramilitary training activities must individually adopt
the unlawful design of the training in order to be criminally liable. In
other words, guilt cannot be imputed to all participants simply because
some of the trainees intended to unlawfully use the acquired knowledge
in furtherance of a civil disorder.
The recent growth and popularity of the citizen militia movement has
spawned strong reactions from public officials, law enforcement groups,
and watchdog organizations. It is likely that reaction to the movement
will include application of the associational, instructional, and participatory bans to the activities of the various citizen militia groups in an
effort to diminish the threat such groups represent to the political and
social structure of America. By pointing out the constitutional implications of the respective bans, it is hoped that questions surrounding the
Second Amendment are given the consideration they ultimately deserve.
Furthermore, legislators, judges, prosecutors, and law enforcement
officials should carefully consider the implications of enforcing the
associational, instructional, and participatory bans in light of the
constitutional concerns enumerated in this Comment.
R.J. LARIZZA

